This backgrounder provides an overview of how the Abraham Accords came about, the US interests involved, their economic and strategic consequences, and the prospects for further enlargement going forward.
The United States plans to submit a resolution on Gaza to the United Nations Security Council by the end of November. Reportedly, the latest draft endorses President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, recognizes the Board of Peace as a “transitional governance administration,” and authorizes the BoP to establish an International Stabilization Force. In a new MEI Policy Memo, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen breaks down why it matters for the US and the relevant policy considerations.
After the Rapid Support Forces’ seizure of al-Fashir, the capital of the North Darfur State and the last remaining stronghold of the Sudanese army, the conflict in Sudan has once again drawn international attention. This development is the latest in a devastating civil war that has lasted over two years. MEI’s Jehanne Henry unpacks the origins of the conflict, the humanitarian situation on the ground, and what needs to happen in the future.
The United States plans to submit a resolution on Gaza to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the end of November. Reportedly, the latest draft endorses President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, recognizes the Board of Peace (BoP) as a “transitional governance administration,” and authorizes the BoP to establish an International Stabilization Force (ISF). The UN resolution is a first step to achieving buy-in from potential ISF contributors. In turn, a viable ISF will be one key to moving beyond the cease-fire to securing the 20-point plan’s envisioned Hamas disarmament, further Israeli military withdrawal, and a path to Palestinian governance. The US faces several dilemmas as it seeks to transition from cease-fire to stabilization and beyond.
By repealing the 2019 Caesar Act sanctions, the United States today can take a meaningful, achievable step to reverse the Assads’ damaging legacy, supporting the emergence of a unified and integrated Syria that engenders peace and prosperity both at home and in the wider region.
For years, Israeli populist politicians have chipped away at the country’s democratic guardrails. But the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023 accelerated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s drive to consolidate power. The kind of societal pushback that once blocked his efforts to expand executive authority is now under severe strain. Israel’s multi-front conflict with Iran, Hamas, and other Iranian proxies has blunted protest movements and sidelined those who once filled the streets in defense of democracy. Defending checks and balances has been eclipsed by wartime priorities.
Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.
Judicial independence is at the core of any successful democracy, and for decades, this issue has been a matter of public concern in Lebanon. At a time when a credible window of opportunity for change has opened in Lebanon, restoring judicial independence is both a necessity and a prerequisite to enable the judiciary to carry out its duties and end the impunity under which it has historically operated.
The current government in Lebanon is keen to encourage financial recovery and find a new path to economic growth. A thorough understanding of the causes behind the country’s recession and the factors constraining a recovery are necessary to shape policy priorities. These are also important as an input into the discussions of the 2026 budget and to the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Using the wrong framework for these decisions could yield low economic growth, which would be harmful for a quick and decisive economic recovery. Conversely, improved economic outcomes and broad buy-in, following public consultations, will ease the implementation of politically difficult reforms. Thus, policymakers must take great care to develop a narrative about how to achieve progress in the short and medium terms that is adjusted to local circumstances.
While the banking crisis remains unresolved, there is still ample scope for Lebanon’s central bank to advance reforms and set the stage for a sustainable economic recovery even without a comprehensive reform program supported by the IMF.
Seizing Lebanon’s once-in-a-generation opportunity hinges on its ability to resolve its core dysfunction: reclaiming the state’s monopoly on force and its exclusive authority to determine matters of war and peace. Beirut, backed by deepening US support, must focus on achieving tangible milestones and strategic victories that momentum, making Hizballah’s disarmament unstoppable and the state’s reassertion of authority irreversible.
The central challenge facing Lebanon today is whether the country will graduate to functional statehood or continue struggling to survive. Yet with Lebanese officials now insisting that the state “monopolize arms” and become the decisive arbiter on matters of war and peace, a relevant question arises: Where, territorially, does Lebanon begin and end?
To encourage and incentivize long-overdue structural reforms, the European Union and the broader international community should adopt a more proactive, hands-on approach to Lebanon. The current context calls for an approach that balances assistance delivery with active support to the Lebanese government in its quest to reform and rebuild the state.
The October 2025 cease-fire and hostage-release deal that ended the Israel-Hamas conflict marks the beginning of a complicated post-war phase. The agreement has created important opportunities to advance stability in the Middle East and build a lasting and sustainable peace marked by enhanced regional security and integration, but there are considerable risks to manage. Achieving these goals will require coordinated international action along multiple lines of effort: security, rule of law, recovery and reconstruction, responsive governance, and steady and focused diplomacy to build confidence among key parties.
After two terrible years — beginning on the horrific morning of October 7, 2023 — there is now a chance the Gaza war could end. This chance exists not because the 20-point proposal released by the United States on September 29, 2025, is a model of diplomatic detail or nuance. It exists because its patron, President Donald Trump, appears determined not to take “no” for an answer.