The Pakistani General Running Washington’s Backchannel to Tehran
As Washington and Tehran edge closer to escalation, the most critical line of communication keeping the crisis from spiraling is being run not by polished diplomats, but by an unlikely figure: a Pakistani general. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s powerful army chief, has quietly become the key intermediary in the U.S.-Iran standoff, managing what may be the most important backchannel between the two sides. The mediation has thrust Pakistan to the center of the crisis while exposing it to enormous risk.
Bonus Episode: Stalled Talks and Next Steps for the US and Iran
This bonus episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing. Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellows Alan Eyre and Daniel Benaim to discuss the historic talks held in Pakistan last weekend between the United States and Iran. Tehran insists the US failed to gain its trust, while the US made its red lines clear and declared it would blockade Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. What happens next? Eyre and Benaim offer insights into what goes on behind the scenes at such negotiations; identify the core issues at play; explore potential incentives to end the war; analyze the weaponization of energy; as well as assess the role of other regional players in this conflict.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict: A strategic concern for the US
Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has shifted from open sponsorship in the 1990s to a silent partnership following 2001 to alienation and belligerence since 2021. Their current conflict, which comes at great cost to both countries and seems to have no easy military or political resolution, also poses a threat to the stability and prosperity of neighboring states. Although American strategic interests in the region greatly diminished following the United States’ military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the region’s altered political dynamics have prompted a growing American engagement with Pakistan and tentatively with Afghanistan. At the same time, the US has become a factor in how both Islamabad and Kabul have come to form their national security strategies.
The aftereffects of the Panama Papers’s leak continue to linger in Pakistan, and their damage only seems to grow worse. Over the next several weeks, there is the possibility that the disclosures may usher in a major political crisis. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is being asked to account for the sources of income that have allowed his family members to buy expensive property in London. At issue is whether these individuals have used offshore companies to avoid paying taxes against their property.
When Pakistani Taliban gunmen stormed a school in December 2014, killing more than 130 schoolboys, it united many Pakistanis in support of a major offensive against the radical group that had been growing more menacing for years.
Why Pakistan Is the Biggest Winner in the Iranian-Saudi Dispute
Saudi Arabia is back, knocking on Pakistan’s door. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud’s son and deputy crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, arrived separately in the early days of the new year to persuade Islamabad to join hands with Riyadh in confronting regional security threats. That is, the Saudis want Pakistan’s support against Iran.
According to the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects 2014, there are 28 “megacities” worldwide (i.e., urban agglomerations with populations in excess of 10 million). By 2030 another dozen will likely be added to their ranks.
U.S. troops in Afghanistan lowered the flag and boxed up their gear at the end of last year as President Obama declared the formal end to 13 years of U.S. combat operations.
This article surveys and critically evaluates sectarian conflicts and trends in Balochistan during the War on Terror, concentrating primarily on the predominantly Shi‘i Hazara community based in Quetta.
Can Kabul and Islamabad Cooperate Effectively on Counterterrorism?
Soon after Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah formed a unity government in Afghanistan in September 2014, there were signs of rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad. When President Ghani visited Pakistan in November, he went to the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi and laid a wreath at the monument to the country’s fallen soldiers—an indication that the Kabul government had come to an understanding with the Pakistani army, which controls the country’s Afghan policy.
On May 13, more than 40 people were killed and at least 13 injured in a gun attack on a bus carrying members of the minority Ismaili Shi‘i sect in Karachi, Pakistan. This was not the deadliest attack of the year, as that dubious honor goes to a suicide bombing in a district in Sindh, which left 61 Shi‘a dead in January. Yet the brazen nature of the attack―carried out in daylight in the bustling megacity of Karachi by gunmen who reportedly boarded the bus and shot at passengers indiscriminately―was striking even in a country where over 2,000 people have been killed and 3,500 injured in sectarian attacks in the past five years.
