الأردن

Saudi Arabia’s archeological treasures have long been hidden in plain sight, known mainly to the people living in their proximity and a handful of scholars. But five recent UNESCO World Heritage Site designations have highlighted the universal value of the country’s material legacy.

The idea of establishing a Levant Union — one not unlike the European Union (EU), but composed of the Levantine states of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and by extension, Egypt and Cyprus — is one that ought to be explored. Such an arrangement would offer untapped potential for trade, supported by the growing trend toward greater regionalization, fueled by the rise in protectionism, increasing multipolarity, and corporate regionalization.

A reliable supply of freshwater is a prerequisite for sustainable socioeconomic development, as well as for sociopolitical stability and human prosperity, especially in semi-arid and arid regions of the world. The Middle East and North Africa’s freshwater resources are under immense pressures and are facing significant risks to their sustainability due to overexploitation, climate change, and interstate competition over their use that extends beyond the region’s boundaries.

It is easy to overlook the fact that food security could be an issue of concern in the Gulf Cooperation Council. After all, its member states have some of the world’s highest per capita income levels. Food supplies in the Gulf are normally abundant and stable. Were they to be disrupted, however, it could lead to food security challenges and a chain of adverse consequences for human security throughout the region.

Competition for security and energy is at the center of recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countries from Egypt to Turkey are moving to secure, exploit, and market their (not always fair) share of the game-changing offshore natural gas reserves. Russia, China, and Iran are securing port facilities, and in the case of Russia, drilling rights, in Lebanon and Syria. 

The Trump administration’s upcoming conference in Bahrain, scheduled for June 25-26, under the pretext of boosting the Palestinian economy, has put Jordan in an unenviable position. Forced to choose, Amman seems to have opted to follow Washington’s wishes over those of its overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian domestic audience.

This piece is an edited transcript of a conversation between Khatia Dekanoidze and Omar Al Rafie hosted by Alex Walsh on the margins of the Conference on the Future of Arab Policing in Amman, Jordan in March 2019. The participants discuss the transformation of the police during Georgia’s political transition, the lessons that could be drawn from this experience that might be applicable to Jordan, and the role of Community Policing as a tool to engage the community and bring about positive change.  

Jordan’s King Abdullah is mobilizing his people ahead of the expected June unveiling of President Donald Trump’s much touted Middle East peace plan. Since returning from a working visit to Washington in March, King Abdullah has been unusually vociferous in his defense of his position on the fate of East Jerusalem and his rejection of any plan that would undermine Jordan’s stability.

The reopening of the Naseeb-Jaber border crossing offers an opportunity to address the pressing political, economic, and humanitarian challenges confronting Jordan.

As naval, air, and ground units from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE conduct war games in western Egypt this month, many speculate that this could represent the birth of the so-called “Arab NATO.”

King Abdullah’s decision to cancel a 25 year land lease to Israel is likely to exacerbate long-simmering tensions between the two nations and challenge the cold peace that has been in place since 1994.

Despite the absence of a public and formal account of what transpired during the meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Helsinki on Jul. 16, it seems that there is at least tacit agreement that effectively endorses the Syrian regime’s takeover of southern Syria and limits Iranian presence in Syrian areas near the Jordanian and Israeli borders.

Two major events in the past few weeks have come into play regarding the future of a de-escalation zone in southern Syria from a Jordanian perspective. The first was the Western coalition’s missile strike on April 13 against Syrian regime positions in retaliation for an alleged chemical attack in the besieged Eastern Ghouta that took place on April 7.