التحليل

The Sept. 14 attack on key Saudi oil facilities, which knocked out over half of the kingdom’s oil production, has signaled a significant change in approach toward regional and global security. It’s clear that things won’t be the same again. But what does it mean for Russia?

The attack reduced Saudi oil production by 5.7 million barrels per day (bpd), leading to a sharp rise in global oil prices of nearly 20%. Although this was a very important development from an energy and economic perspective, we should not underestimate the political and security ramifications either. The entire paradigm of a secure Gulf under the protection of the U.S. military umbrella has been undermined.

Over the past two years, local law enforcement in Hui communities throughout China have made efforts to remove Islamic identity from public spaces. This article shows that these restrictions are part of a broader centralizing effort by the Chinese party-state to emphasize conformity with a vision of Chineseness centered on Han culture, and scrutiny of those ethnic or religious practices that might be deemed “threatening.”

The unprecedented attack on critical Saudi oil infrastructure in Abqaiq and Khurais on Sept. 14 came just days after U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of hawkish National Security Advisor John Bolton had opened a narrow window of diplomacy for Iran-U.S. negotiations to deescalate spiraling tensions.

Riyadh has military options for retaliating against Iran. The Trump administration needs to persuade Saudi leaders not to use them.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Gerald Feierstein, Alex Vatanka, Eran Etzion, Gonul Tol, Amal Kandeel, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Michael Sexton and Eliza Campbell.

Largely overlooked in international policymaking toward Libya’s current conflict is the role of corruption as a key driver of violence, as opposed to merely its byproduct. The high-level debate on Libya at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in late September and the proposed follow-on international conference to be hosted by Germany in October or November are the perfect opportunities to correct this oversight.

Without better infrastructure for using U.S.-made weapons systems, the Arab countries will keep coming up short.

Iran is taking advantage of the partisan political climate in the US and antipathy toward Saudi Arabia to push Trump to back down on sanctions.

At a trilateral summit in Ankara earlier this week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sat back and ate treats as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told the world that efforts to topple the Assad regime have failed. The scene was a stark reminder of how far Turkey’s Syria policy has shifted.

Saudi Arabia is under direct assault, and America’s response is muted. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s verbal threats against Iran, which is behind the attack, he’s not seriously contemplating using force. What’s most urgent now for U.S. policymakers is how to prevent this from happening again and how to most effectively defend U.S. partners from aggression in this still vital part of the world.

Babylon has seen it all. From its peak as the Neo-Babylonian capital under King Nebuchadnezzar through its heavy-handed 1987 reconstruction by Saddam Hussein to its post-invasion demise when American and Polish troops ran roughshod over its ruins and ISIS threatened its very existence, the ancient city has witnessed empires come and go.

Saudi Arabia surprised the global oil and gas industry earlier this month by reshuffling its top two energy positions. Long-serving technocrat Khalid al-Falih was ousted as chair of Saudi Aramco one day and as head of the Ministry of Energy the next.

In late July, Lt. Gen. Michael Anker Lollesgaard left Yemen after his six-month term as the second head of the UN Mission in support of the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) came to an end. Unlike his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, who departed quietly, Lollesgaard was given a proper sendoff from Sana’a. A senior Houthi commander, Maj. Gen. Ali al-Musheki, even went so far as to describe Lollesgaard as “a conscientious military commander.”

Despite constituting about 20 percent of the Israeli population, Israel’s Palestinian minority does not wield significant political power; throughout Israeli history Palestinian parties have played the role of the permanent opposition. While low Israeli-Palestinian electoral participation and the resulting disproportionate parliamentary representation have hampered political influence, these factors are merely one part of a multi-faceted and multi-causal picture. This report seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the exogenous and endogenous drivers of reduced Palestinian political engagement. It is concerned with the structural obstacles –– primarily put in place and sustained by the Israeli right wing –– that seek to impede Palestinian influence at the polls and in the Knesset.