Analysis

Yemen’s eastern governorate of Hadramawt has long had a distinct regional identity and recent steps, including the signing of a Hadrami Honor Charter and the formation of the Hadramawt National Council (HNC), have underscored Hadramis’ aspirations for greater empowerment and autonomy at a time of growing competition and contestation, both locally and regionally.

The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip. Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other.

This week marks one year of Sudan’s brutal civil war, when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) started battling in the capital city of Khartoum. Far from silencing their guns, the two sides continue to fight fiercely to devastating effect; and with scant global attention or outcry, the Sudanese war has quickly become the world’s worst forgotten conflict.

Prime Minister Sudani has been delicately balancing between maintaining bilateral relations with Washington and ensuring political support for his cabinet from pro-Iran hardliners in Baghdad. Both sides have conflicting expectations from the prime minister, and delivering on his promises will come down to his ability to convince each to compromise. But Sudani’s task has now become even more challenging as Iraq finds itself in the middle of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.

Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.

Less than 10 years after seizing power in Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthi militia continues to evolve — and so do the threats emanating from it. After several years of negotiations, it now seems likely that the Houthis and Saudis will reach a peace agreement, and it is worth considering how such a deal could change the group’s trajectory. This report examines a number of possible futures that could develop in Yemen over the next 1-2 years based on shifting capabilities, interests, and alliances.

In a significant and surprising turn of events, on the evening of April 5, a prominent Iraqi leader in the Syrian Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Maysar bin Ali al-Juburi, also known as Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was reportedly killed in an attack in Idlib’s northern countryside.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.

Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?

At the COP28 in Dubai last December, 74 countries, organizations, and multinational development banks officially linked climate change and conflict for the first time in the conference’s history by signing the Declaration on Relief, Recovery, and Peace. This declaration recognizes that countries affected by conflict and fragility are significantly more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and calls for the scaling up of climate finance to help them better prepare for and respond to climate impacts

Public opinion polls indicate that a plurality of Israelis have lost faith in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and support early elections. Recently, this trend has been coupled with renewed demonstrations against the government and maneuvers by key politicians, indicating that the chances Israelis will go to the polls during 2024 are on the rise.

The newly formed government coalition in Islamabad initially looked weak, unstable, and probably short lived. But in the weeks since the outcome of the vote was announced, the political landscape has rapidly changed. Nevertheless, there are portents of trouble ahead that could send Pakistan back into the political tangle from which it has so recently emerged.

Tunisian President Kais Saied appears to be constructing a new economic strategy. While he has previously outlined his priorities with broad strokes, like fighting corruption and defending sovereignty, he has recently begun to add greater detail, adopting a personalized approach that appears to be attempting to bypass the existing corporatist structures.

On March 12, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned four individuals for supporting the Iran-linked al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain. This US announcement might suggest that Iranian-Bahraini relations are about to take a nose-dive. But in reality, that is unlikely to happen — at least not while Iranian-Saudi détente continues.