Analysis

Groundwater resources are critical for the MENA region as much of it suffers from high water scarcity, and for some countries, groundwater aquifers are the only sources of available freshwater supply. The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System in northeastern Africa is one of the most prominent examples, and must be managed properly in order to maintain regional security and avoid transboundary conflicts.

There is an urgent need for a Global Humanitarian Coalition to Defeat ISIS to conduct human rights-centered action and build upon hard-fought military gains in the campaign against ISIS. Repatriation of all third-country nationals in the squalid detention camps and prisons in northeast Syria must be the first joint task in order to ease the burden of the local administration and to accomplish long-sought security, justice, and stabilization goals.

This report provides an interim assessment of the Biden administration’s overall Middle East strategy and examines the strategic opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in the broader region.

As Israel faces a relentless, unprecedentedly severe political crisis at home, in the regional theater Iran has amplified its anti-Israeli activities, undermining the efforts Israel undertook during 2020-22 to build up a common security front with neighboring Arab states against Tehran as well as to intensify various military operations against Iranian interests.

Iran has said that its membership in the BRICS grouping of major emerging economies, announced at the BRICS summit in South Africa in late August, is an “historic achievement,” but what’s really driving Tehran’s actions and how much is its membership likely to achieve?

As important as it is for Ukraine to work with individual partners and receive their long-term support, the key security guarantor for Ukraine can only be NATO and its Article V umbrella. No arrangement other than full NATO membership will entirely remove the threat of a Russian re-invasion, at least so long as Putin remains in power.

Iran has yet to ratify the 2015 Paris Agreement, but efforts to address the impact of climate change have great potential to create opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, building on the recent trend of regional de-escalation. Climate diplomacy represents an untapped opportunity for Iran to engage globally by incentivizing it to adopt the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals in exchange for sanctions or debt relief.

Over the past decade of turmoil, conflict, and external military intervention in Yemen, Oman’s foreign policy has emerged as the Gulf exception. Muscat has pursued a unique role, driven by both pragmatic concern and opportunity. It has harnessed its relations with most of the actors involved, including armed non-state actors, and sought to access new economic opportunities as part of its policies of strategic hedging, omni-balancing, and undeclared alignment.

When Netanyahu takes the stage in this year’s UNGA, much fewer Israelis will see him as their country’s diplomatic savior. Rather, he will be met with unprecedented demonstrations in the streets of New York, showcasing once again the extent to which Israelis are concerned about the damage the current far-right government is causing to their country’s democracy and standing in the world.

As the humanitarian, political, and economic challenges in Syria are occurring simultaneously with increasingly hot and dry summers, conflict- and climate-related factors have compounded, resulting in the emergence of a so-called “triple water crisis.”

When the Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visits New York for the opening of the UNGA this week, he will try to project a sense of confidence and argue that the Iranian regime is purportedly committed to building ties with its neighborhood by promoting and referring to its membership in various regional dialogue forums. Yet their existence has historically not moderated Iranian behavior.

As the original Abraham Accords signatories — Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain — observe the third anniversary of their September 2020 agreement, there is a sufficient basis to evaluate whether the Abraham Accords are real, hype, or something in-between. Much like the case a year ago, the results so far remain mixed.

One year after the tragic death of Mahsa Jina Amini sparked nationwide protests, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been striving to suppress dissent while the spirit of resistance among the people has become an integral part of everyday life. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his allies have failed to address underlying social grievances, and there are no indications that society will remain passive. With both sides actively resisting one another, the options for the Iranian regime and the protest movement have narrowed, potentially leading to a reignition of demonstrations and street confrontations.

The groundbreaking March 2023 normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran could potentially reshape the political landscape of the Middle East. It has already paved the way for de-securitization and the resumption of diplomatic relations. However, critical security issues remain unresolved, casting doubt on the long-term sustainability of the process. Capitalizing on this rare opportunity, Riyadh and Tehran should move forward to finalize a comprehensive non-aggression pact as the foundation for their future security relations.

History might very well show that the people’s protests that broke out in September 2022 in Iran were the final opportunity for the Islamist regime to change political course. But as the past year has shown, the regime in Tehran utterly failed to seize the moment.