This Opinion was first delivered as a speech at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Institute on February 7, 2012
Bashar al-Assad and his top regime cronies appear to be operating under a deeply flawed assumption: the relatively broad-based opposition it now faces is similar to the narrower Muslim Brotherhood challenge it defeated back in 1982 by killing more than 10,000 Syrians in Hama. Much the same way it did 30 years ago, the regime keeps pounding away at the resistance. But unlike the Hama massacre, a few severe blows will not put an end to this latest uprising. Instead, Assad’s brutish tactics will only escalate the bloodshed and resistance.
This Opinion first appeared in The National on February 10, 2012
Despite his popularity at home and abroad, it’s not all roses for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Far from having zero problems with neighbors, Turkey these days is virtually surrounded by neighbors with problems – Greece’s imploding economy, Syria’s civil war, Iraq’s tenuous stability and Iran’s troublesome nuclear program.
This Opinion first appeared in TheAtlantic.com on February 8, 2012
This Opinion was first published on CNN.com on February 6, 2012
The double veto cast by Russia and China at the United Nations Security Council on Saturday represents a clarifying moment in the Syrian uprisings.
At the 2012 Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, "We don't know what the endgame will be until we start the game." Well, fasten your seatbelt — the game over Syria has started.
Iran has two independent naval forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), whose existence predates Iran’s 1979 Revolution, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), which evolved separately in midst of the Iran-Iraq war (1985).
One of the most enduring epithets for Hamas, right up there with “terrorist,” is “proxy.” If you Google “Hamas Iran proxy,” you get 1,750,000 hits. The idea that the relationship between Sunni Hamas, the Gaza affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shia Iran was merely a marriage of convenience and not a true love match is rejected by those who forget that most enduring maxim of Middle East politics: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And implicit in that maxim are two more words: “for now.”
To truly appreciate the political standing of Iran’s regular armed forces in today’s Islamic Republic, the key is to take into account the impact of the ongoing and unparalleled internal feud in the top ranks of the regime. The feud, pitching the factions of Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad against one another in a bitter contest for power, has turned the Artesh into an inescapable entity that neither faction can afford to ignore.
The purpose of this book is to convey to a non-Muslim audience an understanding of Islam, its history, culture, and contribution to civilization.
The Arab League observer mission to Syria—sent under an agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw forces from the cities, release all political prisoners and allow monitors and journalists free movement throughout the country—has utterly failed and should not be extended.
This Opinion piece first appeared in Frontline’s Tehran Bureau on January 19, 2012.
After months of frosty relations, Iran and Turkey are talking again. The ostensible reason for Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to Tehran two weeks ago was to try to jump start stalled nuclear talks with the so-called P5+1 group of nations. Davutoglu conveyed to Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili the European Union’s invitation to resume the talks in Turkey that were suspended a year ago for lack of progress.
Dedicated to the memory of our friend and colleague Chris Boucek
The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interests
*This Opinion first appeared in the Huffington Post on December 13, 2011
The first free and by all accounts fair elections in Egypt mark a major turning point in the country's long history. In what is likely to be a tenuous and trying transition to democracy, Egypt's Islamists won a resounding victory, gaining two-thirds of the vote in the first round of Egypt's parliamentary elections. While many in the West fear that the Islamist victory in this first election will radicalize Egypt, in reality, the situation is far more complex and nuanced.
More than three decades after the Revolution of 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran Army [Artesh-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran] and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami] (IRGC), remain entangled in a state of fierce rivalry.