Analysis

Sunday was a festive day in Baghdad. The last time Iraqis had received an Egyptian president 30 years ago, the region was gearing up for war and uncertainty as the late President Hosni Mubarak shuttled between Baghdad and Gulf capitals prior to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The circumstances were quite different on June 27, when Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and King Abdullah II of Jordan were given the red-carpet treatment at a tripartite summit marking the fourth meeting between the leaders of the three countries aiming to form a new regional alliance.

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are caught in a dangerous deadlock over the Nile River and despite what the international community seems to think, the risk of military confrontation among the three nations is not at all far-fetched. Addis Ababa began the second phase of filling the reservoir behind its giant Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in early May without an agreement with the riparian nations — Egypt and Sudan. However, much has changed over the past year and the second filling has played out rather differently from the first last July. In the intervening months Egypt has ramped up its diplomatic outreach and emerged as an influential player in the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and East and Central Africa. Cairo succeeded in forging strategic alignment with Khartoum to exert diplomatic pressure on Addis Ababa, forming webs of alliances with different regional powers across East and Central Africa and the Horn of Africa to project power and influence, and exerting geopolitical forward pressure on Ethiopia in parallel with the diplomatic track to solve the GERD dispute. 

The Turkish government recently confirmed that the country has approved development plans to carve a new passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Cutting through forests and farmland, the new Canal Istanbul would run parallel to the Bosphorus for a total of 45 km (28 miles) with a depth of 20.75 meters (68 feet) and a width of 275-350 meters (900 to 1150 feet). Ground-breaking for the first bridge over the proposed canal is scheduled to take place on June 26. However, this will be a ceremony for domestic political consumption and by no means indicates that construction is really starting. Financing the massive project might prove impossible due to the environmental concerns and investment risks hanging over it.

According to reporting from The Washington Post, Russia is set to provide Iran with a high-tech satellite called Kanopus-V. Russia will launch the satellite from its territory and then hand over control to an Iranian crew that received essential training in Russia. Iran will control the satellite from a newly built facility in Alborz Province, near Tehran.

Some international concern has been voiced about the future prospects of the Abraham Accords under Israel’s new government. This stems from the perception that the normalization agreements Israel signed in 2020 with the UAE and Bahrain were the personal achievements of two former leaders — Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu — and would not have happened without them. The question thus arises of whether the agreements can survive their departure from power. Not only will the Abraham Accords survive, they will now be able to flourish and reach new heights. Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s statement that his first visit abroad will be to the UAE is a good indicator. 

On June 1, PBS Frontline released a documentary entitled “The Jihadist,” which includes an interview by American journalist Martin Smith with al-Jolani, now the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who “opened his heart” about the past, present, and future of his group. The interview revived the question of whether the international community should believe al-Jolani’s claims about his group’s transformation from global jihadism to a local focus and his denial of the allegations of torture in its prisons. This article argues that while HTS’s transformation and split from al-Qaeda is real, al-Jolani must be pressured to share power over Idlib and loosen his group’s authoritarian grip, which is causing grievances that in the long term will push locals into the hands of radical groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Tbilisi and Washington have in recent years built a strong strategic partnership. Yet, a myriad of threats imposed by Russia on Georgia and the Black Sea region – including a continued “borderization” policy, modernization of the Black Sea Fleet, and attempts to transform the Black Sea into an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone – call for a review of U.S. policy toward Georgia and the wider Black Sea region.

Over the past year, intensifying political and economic conflicts between the Kurdistan Region’s two hegemonic parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have challenged the legal and institutional order in which the Kurdistan Regional Government operates. A new generation of leadership within the parties, a fraught relationship with the federal government, and a prolonged economic crisis have strained the relationship between the two parties to its breaking point.

One of the first foreign policy decisions facing Israel’s new government will be if it wants to maintain or modify the policy spearheaded by Netanyahu to counter the United States’ determined effort to return to the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Moreover, the new government needs to assess how successful the maximalist approach Israel has embraced since the negotiations between Iran and the great powers began about two decades ago has been, and to what extent it has pushed the international community to refrain from making concessions and compromises vis à vis Iran.

As one of the hottest and driest spots globally, the Middle East region faces some of the worst impacts of climate change. Many of these events have not only been socially and politically devastating but have also resulted in huge financial losses for countries already experiencing economic insecurity. Countries in MENA have found themselves increasingly exposed to extreme weather events and natural disasters, which have affected more than 40 million people and cost more than $20 billion over the past 30 years, according to the World Bank. During the last five years alone, 120 disasters were recorded in the region, resulting in an average of $1 billion annually in damages and losses.

On Dec. 21, 2020, the United States Congress passed the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act. The new law provides $250 million over five years to expand peace and reconciliation programs between Israelis and Palestinians as well as to support projects bolstering the Palestinian economy. But such programs are unlikely to be effective because the whole approach on which they are based is structurally flawed in two critical ways: first, because it is disconnected from local political, social, cultural, and economic processes and expectations; and second, because it tends to reinforce the inequalities that sustain the conflict between the two sides while undermining the declared goals of this intervention.

The Biden administration has repeatedly said that Israelis and Palestinians “deserve equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity and dignity” (sometimes expressed as “equal measures of freedom, security, dignity and prosperity”). Since the recent crisis in Gaza and East Jerusalem, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other U.S. officials have reiterated this formula in one form or another. What is its significance? What does (or should) it mean in the context of the Biden administration’s approach to Israel/Palestine — particularly given the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, pending expulsions in East Jerusalem, and ongoing settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem? We asked eight experts to weigh in with their thoughts.

Over the past four years, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has tried to transform itself from a faction of the Global Jihad movement into the de facto local military and governing power in north-west (NW) Syria. This shift requires the group to seek sources of funding other than al-Qaeda and its donors; consequently, HTS has undertaken a slow but steady takeover of the economy in NW Syria, from financial services and oil and gas to internet and telecommunications. This paper lays out how that process has taken place and provides a detailed look at the economics of HTS.

The June 12 election for the National Assembly, the lower house of the Algerian parliament, shows that the country is stuck between, on the one side, a political system led by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and backed by the army that rejects deep change and, on the other side, a population that has lost faith in the old system. Preliminary results announced June 15 indicated the phoenix-like return of discredited political parties that had strongly supported former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, deposed in 2019. But in a sense President Tebboune is now more isolated than ever. His remark that he didn’t care about the record low voter turnout in the election shows the distance between him and most of the Algerian public.

The performance of Iraqi political parties over the past two decades can be assessed in how they manage three major transformations: the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic and pluralistic one, the participation of these parties in managing the transformation of the state from a central to a federal system and the smooth transition from a directed economy to a free market one, and the social transformation from an oppressed society to a free, productive, and reconciled one. Despite the great challenges faced by the various governments since 2003, the parties that participated in the political process (to varying degrees) were unable to succeed in managing these three transformations.