Analysis

On December 18, Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced a new cabinet as part of his efforts to implement the political annex of the Riyadh Agreement (RA) signed on November 5, 2019 between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). The agreement included several political, security and economic provisions such as: the formation of a new government that includes the STC; the disarmament and integration of militias and military formations under the auspices of the ministries of defense and interior; support of the Yemeni economy; and the demilitarization of Aden.

In the 1950s, at the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan and Turkey were part of the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO, a pro-Western bloc of Muslim-majority states. Today, the two countries — both with troubled relations with the United States — are Muslim middle powers with a growing entente in a multipolar Eurasia. In recent years, cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened not just in the defense, diplomatic, and economic realms, but also in the cultural space, causing geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the Arabian Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.

Georgia’s Western future became a central part of U.S. foreign policy last week. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that Georgia should join NATO as soon as it meets the criteria. Blinken’s remarks are timely. Georgia faces increasing Russian political pressure and military presence, exacerbated by the recent second Nagorno Karabakh war. At the same time, and following a decade of stalemate, there have been significant breakthroughs in the cases brought by Georgia against Russia in front of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). With Georgia’s Western path resurfacing on the international agenda, Eastern European countries will be watching to see if the Biden Administration’s foreign policy can make a difference to regional security.

Saturday marks the 100th day since Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri secured a razor-thin majority nomination to form a new cabinet — his fourth in 11 years. In October 2019, street protests had forced his “national unity” government to resign. His comeback a year later was a cause for disillusionment among protesters and a signal that politics as usual, in its collusive and inefficient nature, was there to stay. The absurdity of the Lebanese debacle lies in how easy and acceptable it was — and still is — for the established political class to shy away from crucial and courageous decisions when the country needed them most.

This report discusses the results of the 2020 Syrian parliamentary elections to illuminate shifts in the al-Assad regime’s strategy to restore and maintain control over the country. Using evidence gathered from a range of sources, it sheds light on recent changes in the ethnic, religious, political, commercial, and military networks through which Syria’s dictatorship is sustained, and the future directions these shifts imply.

In Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, coverage of negotiations around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has tended to consistently be in the news over the past few years. The events of the last few weeks, however, have easily pushed GERD talks to the side. On Nov. 4, 2020, Ethiopian federal government forces started pounding the Tigray region, one of 10 semiautonomous regions in the country, after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of attacking a federal base. Relations had been disintegrating after Abiy cancelled elections, due to COVID, that would have marked the end of his term. While most of Ethiopia’s ethnic minorities took umbrage, the TPLF went a step further by holding their own elections, the results of which were declared null and void by the federal government.

From the U.S. and the U.K. to Iraq and Syria, the way countries are handling the repatriation and prosecution of accused ISIS members echoes the policies that drove their citizens to seek a utopian Islamic State in the first place. Not only are the policies that pushed people to start joining the group in 2013 continuing, but in many cases they have increased in both scale and scope. While the current repatriation and prosecution policies are arguably counterproductive, they may also be fueling future terrorist activity and support for radical anti-government groups. To reduce the chances of such negative consequences, foreign governments must switch gears and adopt an entirely different approach before it is too late.

In mid-January the press reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will soon participate in a joint military exercise with the United States, Canada, Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus, and Israel. While Israel’s inclusion is certainly newsworthy, it is also quite significant that the drill will take place in and be coordinated by Greece. This is just the latest step in a long process of engagement between Athens and Abu Dhabi.

America’s foreign policy needs a diversity of faith to face changing 21st century realities.

Turkey’s efforts to strike a different tone were apparent on Jan. 25 in Istanbul, when Greek and Turkish officials resumed talks after a five-year gap to calm tensions in the Aegean and Mediterranean. The fact that the parties met is welcome news after the two came to the brink of war recently over offshore energy exploitation rights, but no one expected a breakthrough. The tensions between the two countries have a long history and the issues dividing Athens and Ankara are too deep to bridge.

Given the host of challenges that Algeria currently faces and consistent with past efforts to diversify its foreign relations, Algeria could seek to deepen its relationship with China — a rising global power with deep pockets and an expanding footprint in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and a country with which Algeria has already established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Yet, even under a scenario in which Beijing answers the call, it should not be assumed that the scale and contours of Chinese engagement will fundamentally change, will consist mainly of predatory economic activities and malign influences, or can rescue Algeria from structural problems of its own making.

Because of football’s popularity, there is significant involvement by regime insiders. The Revolutionary Guards’ transition from barracks to boardrooms began back in the mid-1990s, when they took on management roles in some of the country’s most high-profile sports. Sports were not high on the agenda for the revolutionaries who overthrew the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, but as sports has grown in popularity and in profitability, it has become increasingly politicized.  Over the past two decades, most sports clubs and related bodies have been taken over by political or security-military organizations, with former Revolutionary Guards holding the top positions.

As long as weapons transfers to armed non-state actors are not adequately restricted and the monopoly of violence is not exclusively in the hands of the government, it will be impossible to build sustainable peace in Yemen.

In recent weeks, power outages and severe air pollution have plagued Iran’s major cities.

In 1906, the South Caucasus’ first energy pipeline was completed, connecting Baku on the Caspian Sea with Batumi on the Black Sea. More than 115 years later, this pipeline, measuring a mere eight inches in diameter and transporting kerosene, has been replaced with a modern network of natural gas and oil pipelines connecting the heart of Asia with Europe. With proper investment and the correct policies, even more oil, gas, and other goods will be flowing from the Caspian region to Europe and global markets.