Osama bin Laden may be dead, but his ghost was in Riyadh the other day, hovering over Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah as he issued a decree making it a crime for any Saudi citizen to take part in a war outside the kingdom.
The obvious motivator was the civil war in Syria, where hundreds of young Saudis have been spotted in the ranks of the most radical jihadi groups battling both the government and other less extreme rebels. But the roots of the king’s action, and the problem it was designed to address, can be traced to the 1980s war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
De-Ba`thification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice
The de-Ba`thification process in Iraq has fallen profoundly short as a transitional justice mechanism over the past decade. Poorly conceived, badly implemented, and controlled by hard-liners, the process has been so highly politicized that it has eroded the rule of law and intensified the sectarian tensions that are at the heart of the violence haunting Iraq.
In most wars combatants wield aid as a weapon, circumscribing humanitarian access and impeding assistance to civilians in enemy-held territory, hoping that hunger will starve resistance into submission or undermine the morale of foes. In no war is this truer than in Syria, where the horror of a prolonged vicious conflict has been compounded by aid being held hostage to politics and combat. The lack of adequate medical care, food, and shelter has added to the death toll and misery that has made Syria the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe this century.
Dressing for Diplomatic Success: Iranian Negotiations Lead the Way
In the Middle East today, diplomatic success and failure are unfolding side by side, often with some of the same players. High-profile attempts are being made to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, to stop the massacre of innocents in Syria, and to bring Iran in from the cold.
Collection Spotlight: America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East
America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, by Hugh Wilford, 2013
A tale of how the CIA set sail into the Middle East with the best intentions, ran aground on its own failings, and was overwhelmed by forces and events it could not control.
“Amal”[1] fled violence in the countryside outside of Damascus with her husband, father, and five children almost two years ago. The family moved to Salamieh, a Syrian town of approximately 100,000 people 33 kilometers southeast of Hama. Salamieh is still under the control of the government armed forces, and many displaced people, mainly Sunnis from Homs, Aleppo, and the Damascus area, have sought refuge there and in surrounding towns.
With a major push from the U.S., a new Syrian peace conference opened Wednesday in Switzerland, the first such effort since the middle of 2012. It wasn’t easy getting everyone there, and it will be harder still to achieve a breakthrough.
Qanats and Water Cooperation for a Sustainable Future
This essay is part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) series on “Harvesting Water and Harnessing Cooperation: Qanat Systems in the Middle East and Asia.”
Since the departure of U.S. ground forces from Iraq in 2011 in the wake of failed negotiations to extend the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement, the security situation in Iraq has steadily declined. To many, the situation was predictable, as the absence of a residual U.S. force to mature the Iraqi security forces and moderate long-standing political tensions among the sects led to a security vacuum filled by extremists and terrorists. To others, 10 years of investment and over 4,000 troops lost was enough, and it was time for the Iraqis to resolve their own internal conflicts.
The following is an excerpt from “Iraq’s Tangled Foreign Interests and Relations,” written by MEI Vice President Paul Salem and published by the Carnegie Middle East Center on December 24, 2013. Click here to view the full report.
Scenarios of Change and Possibilities of Reform in Lebanon
The recent spate of bombings in Beirut underline the degree to which Lebanon has become entangled in the wider regional conflict being fought in and around Syria, but the paralysis of Lebanon’s political institutions indicate an equally deep domestic dysfunction. There is no doubt that part of Lebanon’s problems derive from its difficult geostrategic environment and require external developments and changes, and part of them come from the weaknesses of its domestic political and socioeconomic system and require internal reform.
