In a new special briefing, scholars from across MEI weigh in with their thoughts on the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh and the potential regional impact.
On July 16, the United States and Saudi Arabia announced a new framework for space collaboration and civil aeronautics that shakes up the space race. The agreement marks a turning point for the US-Saudi Arabia bilateral relationship, gearing it more toward scientific cooperation and demonstrating the pivotal role that emerging space powers, particularly in the Middle East, are poised to play in the Second Space Age.
Although Russia and China are in regular dialogue with the Houthis, the motivations that undergird the engagements of both countries differ markedly. The Houthis regard both Russia and China as partners against American unilateralism but have a warmer relationship with Moscow.
The conventional wisdom is that Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is yet another bit of window dressing put up by the “deep state” in Tehran, which effectively calls the shots on the most contentious foreign policy files. But it might just be that Pezeshkian’s sudden emergence as president was orchestrated from the outset as a pretext for the Iranian regime to change course.
The Houthis’ strategy of escalation has the potential to upset the fragile balance of power in the Middle East and underlines the ability of smaller actors to influence larger geopolitical outcomes through calculated risks and alliances.
The current situation is not only intolerable – it is unsustainable. It is time to recognize that the Houthis, with strong and persistent support from Iran, are in a position to hold not only the US but virtually the entire global system hostage.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
In the aftermath of the December 2023 Provincial Council (PC) elections, political parties across Iraq have been seeking to shore up their gains or minimize their losses in the formation of the provincial executive governments, with some provinces, like Kirkuk and Diyala, remaining in deadlock at time of writing. However, in other provinces, such as Ninewa, those now in power are looking to ensure that they are maximizing their new gains by dominating key administrative positions at the district and subdistrict levels.
On July 16, CENTCOM announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. But the reality is far worse than this statement suggested because the data represents only a fraction of ISIS’s actual attacks in Syria and Iraq.
The Houthis’ latest political and military moves are setting them on a collision course with the United Arab Emirates in the broader Red Sea region.
At the Washington Summit, NATO member states mostly focused on efforts to counter Russia and to support Ukraine. However, the 2024 summit communiqué also addresses non-Euro-Atlantic risks and opportunities, based on the idea that “conflict, fragility and instability” elsewhere directly affects NATO security.
Pakistan’s government is pursuing a two-track approach to stabilize the country’s long-troubled economy. It is engaged in lengthy negotiations with the IMF to secure at least $6 billion in loans to shore up its ability to service its external debt. At the same time, Islamabad is also trying to woo its Gulf allies, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in a bid to diversify its sources of external financing, address the lingering threat of insolvency, and put its economy on an upward trajectory of sustainable growth.
Politics in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is centered on the ruling duopoly of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Other political parties — broadly referred to as the opposition — offer themselves as alternatives to the KDP and the PUK, but are disorganized, divided, and largely unable to capitalize on public grievances about governance. At present, they do not constitute a viable alternative to the ruling parties.
A little over a year ago, the icy relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia underwent a remarkable thaw. But beneath this détente, a new front emerged in their longstanding rivalry — one rooted not in geopolitics or religious ideologies but in the realm of soft power and societal aspirations.
Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Mishal Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, took his next step in governance without a parliament in place on June 1, when he appointed Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Sabah as crown prince. Although the timing of the announcement suspending portions of the constitution and dissolving the parliament caught most observers off guard, the emir’s decision was not surprising.