Technology represents one potentially fruitful area where the I2U2 member states — Israel, India, the U.S. and the UAE — could cooperate together, expand their format to include more countries, deliver tangible results, and avoid agitating other global and regional powers.
Two years after the signing of the Abraham Accords, progress in developing relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors has achieved mixed results, opening up some greater cooperation in the security sphere but failing to change Arab publics’ minds due to the lack of movement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
When acclaimed Saudi artist Abdulnasser Gharem opened his first solo show in New York City last week, it closed the circle on a story that began more than two decades ago on Sept. 11, 2001, and the wars and chaos that followed. The 49-year-old Gharem, a seminal figure in and pioneer of Saudi Arabia’s contemporary art scene, hopes his exhibition Hospitable Thoughts, at the Marc Straus Gallery through Oct. 16, will spark a “new cultural dialogue.”
The battle for control of the Yemeni heartland and its energy resources has reached a turning point. Yemen’s internationally recognized institutions are, once again, in crisis. In fact, the current infighting within the “government camp” threatens both the long-stalled implementation of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and the political legitimacy of the newly-established Presidential Leadership Council.
The announcements in mid-August that both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait will be returning their ambassadors to Tehran after six years provided the latest indication that the diplomatic ice has started to break in the Gulf region.
The United States and its Gulf Arab partners need a new security arrangement that effectively shares the burden of defending against Iranian hostility and goes beyond deterrence.
The July 2022 leaders’ meeting took good steps on energy and food security, but Egypt and Saudi Arabia can help take the I2U2 to the next level when it comes to regional security.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE purchased $5 billion of U.S. air-defense missiles at a time when multiple American partners around the world are also looking to buy the same systems. The main effort in the Gulf will continue to be training and provisions of the material to develop an indigenous missile-defense capability.
After achieving respectable growth in 2021, the GCC member states now face the risk of monetary (over) tightening due to the need to follow the U.S Federal Reserve’s interest rate adjustments. These increases are not warranted, however, as the GCC economies currently face relatively moderate inflation. Instead, they should use the available fiscal space to mitigate the negative fallout of monetary tightening and make greater use of PPPs for future infrastructure development.
At the Jeddah summit in mid-July, President Joe Biden declared that “America is back,” a message that was welcomed by Saudi Arabia and Gulf media outlets. But Washington cannot maintain its influence and develop robust relationships in the Middle East without sustained American interest and effort, which have been oscillating with every change in administration.
The U.N.-sponsored truce of April 2022 is the longest pause in fighting Yemen has experienced since the Houthi armed rebellion broke out in September 2014 and the Saudi-led coalition forces intervened six months later. But although there is strong external interest in both extending and expanding the truce given the scale of turmoil in the global arena, credible progress remains lacking, while serious obstacles persist.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
The last few years have seen a lot of consolidation in Gulf financial sectors. Not only do these mergers create economic benefits, the merged entities also become potent tools for economic development. The mega-funds and other major financial institutions are part of a trend where Gulf political elites sidestep ossified bureaucracies and instead centralize power in private entities over which they have even more control.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has surrounded himself with those who would indulge him and pose little threat. His circle comprises younger, less experienced but presumably loyal princes in key ministerial positions as well as a few select, savvy, experienced older half-brothers and uncles loyal to his father. There are also several notable royal holdovers from smaller family branches, the odd competent technocrat, and a cadre of minions from across the military and security agencies.
Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s meandering efforts to explain his about-face on Saudi Arabia—visiting the country this week after having dubbed it a “pariah” on the campaign trail—there remains much apprehension about his trip on both ends of the political spectrum. Progressives and human rights advocates worry the president will sacrifice U.S. values for short-term Faustian bargains in an attempt to secure cheap oil and expand Arab-Israeli normalization. Republicans and realists, who favor an interest-driven approach to foreign policy, aren’t sure there is enough to be gained by Washington on these fronts to justify a presidential visit.