Research & Commentary Results

Jordan is facing an existential challenge and it has nothing to do with the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the war in neighboring Syria, or the threat of militant Islamists. The challenge is climate change, which is responsible for poor rainy seasons over the past few years. The situation has become so bad that in the past few weeks the government admitted that six of the kingdom’s 14 active dams have now completely dried up, exacerbating endemic shortages of water used for drinking, irrigation, and industry.

تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.

Jordan is going full speed ahead in normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, 10 years after it suspended political and economic ties with its northern neighbor in the wake of the eruption of the Syrian uprising. On Oct. 3, and in the first public contact between Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, Amman announced that the king had received a call from Assad. Talks focused on bilateral relations and ways to strengthen cooperation. The king stressed Jordan’s support for efforts to back Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity. Jordan had allowed the Syrian embassy to remain open in Amman and kept a skeleton staff at its embassy in Damascus.

The formation of a new government in Lebanon — after more than a year of political deadlock and amid an economic crisis of dizzying severity — is a positive development. The scale of Lebanon’s economic challenges, however, requires a new government capable of breaking with its predecessors’ deliberate inaction. It necessitates strong and genuine political leadership, will, and action to tackle the country’s many pressing challenges, especially in its dysfunctional energy sector.

While much of the discourse surrounding the Iron Dome controversy is mired in hysterics and hyperbole, some have put forward a more rational case for providing additional funding for it. One of the standard arguments advanced in recent days is that Iron Dome is crucial not only for saving Israeli lives but is equally important (perhaps even more so) for saving Palestinian lives. This claim has been echoed by numerous American and Israeli analysts and even Members of Congress, and seems to have been accepted by a number of journalists as well. But is it actually true?

One of the most consequential changes in the Middle East’s geopolitical map is happening at the water’s edge. Along the entire eastern rim of the Mediterranean basin, global and regional actors are engaging in a spate of port capacity expansions, new private port construction, and the sell-off of major state-owned ports that will determine who sits atop the region’s global trade flows for decades to come. The international competition to rebuild Beirut’s port is one key puzzle piece in this larger process that is reconfiguring the Levant’s maritime commercial architecture and, as a consequence, the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.

The possibility that the Lebanese government could opt for China to reconstruct Beirut’s port has raised alarm in Washington and European capitals given China’s already outsized commercial port presence in Egypt, Israel, and Greece. Increased Chinese involvement in Lebanon’s port operations could consolidate Beijing’s hold over the commercial connectivity architecture of the Levant. Re-orienting global commercial flows between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia according to Beijing’s priorities would make China’s Belt and Road Initiative a dominant organizing principle in the international relations of the Middle East. The most effective way to offset China’s ambition may be to facilitate Mediterranean rivals France and Turkey to jointly rebuild Beirut’s port.

As a Lebanese actor ideologically tied to Iran, Hezbollah has multiple allegiances and objectives that do not always align symmetrically. Hezbollah’s regional activities are a reflection of the group’s increasingly close alignment with Iran, rather than the interests of the Lebanese state or citizenry. Today, Hezbollah’s regional adventurism is most pronounced in its expeditionary forces deployed in Syria and elsewhere in the region, but no less important are the group’s advanced training regimen for other Shi’a militias aligned with Iran, its expansive illicit financing activities across the region, and its procurement, intelligence, cyber, and disinformation activities. Together, these underscore the scale and scope of the group’s all-in approach to transforming from one of several Lebanese militias into a regional player acting at Iran’s behest.

التقى العاهل الأردني الملك عبد الله الاثنين بالرئيس جو بايدن، ليكون بذلك أول زعيم من منطقة الشرق الأوسط يقوم بهذه الزيارة، متطلعًا إلى إصلاح جوانب العلاقات الثنائية التي تأزمت خلال السنوات الأربع الماضية. وهو سيجد في الإدارة الجديدة فريقًا أكثر ميلًا لوجهة نظره بشأن القضايا الإقليمية عما كان عليه الحال في علاقته مع الإدارة الأمريكية السابقة.

Sunday was a festive day in Baghdad. The last time Iraqis had received an Egyptian president 30 years ago, the region was gearing up for war and uncertainty as the late President Hosni Mubarak shuttled between Baghdad and Gulf capitals prior to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The circumstances were quite different on June 27, when Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and King Abdullah II of Jordan were given the red-carpet treatment at a tripartite summit marking the fourth meeting between the leaders of the three countries aiming to form a new regional alliance.

In the final leg of his recent Middle Eastern tour, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stopped in Amman for half a day to meet King Abdullah. Blinken’s main objective was to support the shaky cease-fire reached between Palestinian factions in Gaza and Israel after an 11-day military showdown. Speaking at a press conference on May 26, Blinken said that “the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah was crucial, as it always has been in different issues, his role was essential in reaching a cease-fire in Gaza.”  Jordanians were less confident of their government’s role in ending what most saw as “Israeli aggression against Gaza,” however. Even before the recent military clash Jordanian pundits, some known for their close ties to the government, were critical of the lukewarm official response to the Israeli provocations of Palestinians at Al-Aqsa Mosque and in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem.

At a press conference on Thursday, MK Mansour Abbas, head of the newly elected Islamist party in Israel, the United Arab List (Ra’am), made what many in the Israeli media dubbed a historic speech. In an effort to reach out to the Jewish Israeli public, he spoke in Hebrew and during the prime time on television often given to Israeli politicians. Speaking surrounded by the party’s green flags, the conservative Islamist quotedverses from the Quran calling for the creation of “an opportunity for a shared life, in the holy and blessed land for the followers of the three religions and both peoples” and told his Hebrew-speaking audience that “Now is the time for change.”

On Feb. 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hosted his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in Moscow. After their meeting, Lavrov emphasized Russia and Jordan’s shared positions on Syria, Gulf security, and Israel-Palestine.

For years pundits have argued that Palestinian elections cannot take place in the occupied territories until there is reconciliation between the warring factions of Fatah and Hamas. The conflict between them led to the creation of two parallel governments, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of Gaza. This situation produced parallel laws and, most importantly, parallel security forces. While these differences remain unresolved, elections, which were once considered impossible without reconciliation, are now being used to achieve reconciliation. On January 11, a Palestinian presidential decree announced legislative elections for May 22 to be followed by presidential elections on July 31.

This calendar lists key dates in the MENA region in 2021, broken down by month. It is subject to change and will be updated over the course of the year.

The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the most important figure in Iran’s nuclear program, in late November 2020 is a major failure for Iran’s intelligence services. Despite all the secrecy and the emphasis on protecting Fakhrizadeh, however, he was still assassinated in the Absard area, about 70 km from Tehran, on Nov. 27. Why was he killed despite such a high level of protection, and what effect will his death have on the Iranian regime’s intelligence and security structures?