In two months, Lebanon is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in the midst of a continuing economic meltdown and total failure of governance. The outcome of the vote is likely to be disappointing for anyone expecting to elect new leaders capable of reforming Lebanon.
As Russia’s two-week-old war against Ukraine has brought Lebanon’s wheat imports from the besieged Black Sea nation to a complete standstill, the government in Beirut is racing against the clock to avert a catastrophic food crisis.
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Randa Slim and Amb. Edward Gabriel discuss the daunting trifecta of economic, financial, and political crises Lebanon currently faces and what they anticipate for the country’s future.
Lebanon is currently at a crossroads as the government faces the daunting tasks of rebuilding the economy, restoring public trust, and clearing the way for free and fair parliamentary elections in May of 2022. The country finds itself spiraling downward — an agreement with the IMF is yet to be realized, poverty and emigration are increasing, and there are growing threats to stability due to a failing economy and widespread corruption. Given this critical situation, it is worthwhile to review U.S. interests in Lebanon’s survival and consider key recommendations for U.S. policy to help Lebanon avoid complete collapse and help the Lebanese people move toward economic recovery, political legitimacy, and a more capable, transparent, and sovereign state.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
In the past several months, Biden administration officials have been pushing back against an encroaching narrative that the United States has abandoned the Middle East. But deepening partnerships built on a shared threat are not enough to assuage the concerns of all valuable allies in the region given the increasing perceptions of U.S. unreliability. To address these concerns, the U.S. needs to identify positive nexuses across policy priorities as well. One ripe option in this frame is Lebanon, where the United States has a reliable and long-standing partner in the Lebanese Armed Forces.
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a number of weaknesses in government response, including a fragmentation of the decision-making process, inadequate consultation with experts, opacity of epidemiological data, as well as a lack of health care capacity, collective action, and general preparedness. Perhaps above all though, the pandemic has highlighted the inadequacy of communication with the public and their lack of involvement in the decision-making process. While the novel coronavirus caught all governments by surprise, some governments, especially those that enjoy high levels of trust (and not necessarily the wealthiest ones), have fared better than others. This has prompted some countries to hold public hearings to gain more insight into decision-making during the pandemic and rebuild trust in institutions. Strikingly but unsurprisingly, no country in the Arab world has yet called for a public inquiry into COVID-19. While this is even more relevant for countries that have traditionally enjoyed democratic governance and for countries that have suffered disproportionately rom the pandemic, this exercise could be useful for all Arab countries in regaining the trust needed to better respond to future crises.
Repeated crises in Lebanon, including the COVID-19 pandemic, have highlighted the need for resilience in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Amid the current acute economic and financial crisis facing the country, there are warning signs about the LAF’s incapacity to continue, as the resources at its disposal and popular confidence in its effectiveness have both been degraded. In light of the current challenges and those that may lie ahead, the LAF needs to become more resilient, able to both adapt and strengthen as an organization, while also ensuring public security, the conditions of its personnel, and its own long-term status.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
After 13 months of political gridlock, economic collapse, and civil unrest, Lebanese politicians formed a new government on Sept. 10. Three-time Prime Minister Najib Mikati heads a new cabinet, the first since the previous one resigned in the wake of Beirut’s devastating port blast in August 2020. Though the formation of a new government provides a way forward to address the myriad crises facing the country, it falls far short of the near-revolutionary changes demanded by Lebanese citizens protesting in the streets. Instead of non-partisan specialists forming a new unity government, Lebanon’s notorious sectarian elites have handpicked a government of technocrats close to them to handle the current situation, the most brazen of which are the new ministers of finance and public works.
In recent years, Israel has waged a campaign against the military buildup of its enemies, mainly Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. This ongoing effort is called “the campaign between the wars,” or the Mabam Campaign. Several events in recent weeks have given rise to questions about the effectiveness of this campaign, however, and have underscored the need to rethink its future.
Memories of the Lebanese civil war resurfaced this week as images appeared of children hiding in hallways and behind cars while deadly sectarian clashes unfolded outside their schools in Beirut’s Tayouneh neighborhood. Protests organized by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement to demand the removal of the judge investigating the August 2020 Beirut port blast quickly went south when as yet unidentified snipers opened fire on the crowds, eventually killing seven and wounding dozens. The “peaceful” protesters seemingly retaliated with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades. The two sides turned Tayouneh and its surrounding areas into a war zone, terrorizing citizens and destroying property at a time of unprecedented socio-economic hardship.
توقّفت شبكة الكهرباء اللبنانية عن العمل نهاية الأسبوع الماضي مع نفاذ الوقود في محطتي الطاقة الرئيسيتين في البلاد. توفر هاتان المحطتان، الزهراني ودير عمار، 45٪ من كهرباء لبنان من مؤسسة كهرباء لبنان المملوكة للدولة. التوقُّف هو الأحدث في سلسلة من الانقطاعات المتزايدة للشبكة واستخدام الحكومة للضغط العام لتقديم مزيد من المدفوعات المُسبَقة أو السُلف للمرفق المفلس ليتمكن من دفع ثمن واردات الوقود، وبالتالي الإبقاء على الوضع الراهن المستمر منذ 30 عامًا.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.