اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Bafel Talabani is a frequent visitor to Baghdad, traveling to Iraq’s capital an estimated 35 times since the beginning of 2022 or more than once every two weeks on average. It is indicative of a deliberate strategy by the PUK to increase its activity within Iraq’s federal system, making it a priority, rather than merely an afterthought, to political affairs in the Kurdistan Region.
The next few decades will be crucial for Iraq and the KRG as global changes reshape the energy sector. The push for sustainable development, the Paris Agreement climate goals, and associated efforts in areas like renewable energy, climate change, and environmental protection will bring about a transition across the sector, affecting everything from employment and working patterns to governance.
The Gulf Arab states, while major oil and gas producers, can play a significant role in supporting global efforts to achieve net-zero goals. They are not only endowed with great potential for renewable energy resources as well as some of the world’s lowest carbon content fuels, but also with, to varying extents, sizable financial resources. Yet, to unlock such huge potential, the Gulf Arab states will need to systematically identify and address the various challenges in their path to net zero.
The traditional 20th-century pillars of U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations are energy and security — a reflection of Cold War dynamics and the critical role that Saudi Arabia plays in the global economy as an energy superpower. Now, in 2023, Riyadh and Washington should think beyond energy to explore opportunities and address critical challenges in areas such as tech and cyber, which could ultimately cement their strategic relations for the 21st century.
Even as the Iran-backed Houthi rebels pursue back-channel talks with Saudi Arabia as Riyadh looks for a major de-escalation in the coming weeks, they have also been ratcheting up the pressure on the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government. The Houthis’ strikes on government-controlled critical infrastructure exhibit the same strategic use of Iranian-supported non-conventional warfare tactics seen in their previous cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The difficulty of quickly providing mechanized and armored equipment to Ukraine, training Ukraine to employ this equipment in combined arms operations, and ensuring Ukraine can maintain and sustain combat power should not be underestimated. As the examples of Turkey’s 2016 military operation in Syria and the U.S. operation in Fallujah in 2004 illustrate, dislodging Russia from its prepared defensive positions will be a daunting task for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Despite massive hydrocarbon reserves, Iraq struggles with chronic electricity shortages. There is a clear need to explore cleaner alternatives, such as renewable energy systems, yet the deployment and integration of these systems would be hindered by the same structural woes that have crippled the electricity sector, and which go far beyond generation issues.
Although U.S.-Saudi bilateral ties are on the mend, ambiguities and the transactional nature of the 1945 oil-for-security covenant contribute to mistrust and tensions. The burden of fixing or stabilizing the relationship is a shared responsibility. It’s time for Washington and Riyadh to reconfigure their security ties in accordance with new U.S. geopolitical priorities and new Saudi defense requirements. This report lays out such a process.
A Saudi-Houthi agreement now looks increasingly likely, but it is highly doubtful that such a deal by itself will end the multi-layered war or build a sustainable peace.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
In its first 100 days in office, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani has already left warning signs about what might lie ahead for the country. Although it is still in its early days, government actions have largely strayed from the promises Sudani made before taking office and resulted in setbacks on several fronts.
Despite formal agreements and vast financial resources, Saudi Arabia has largely failed to integrate the various armed groups in Aden and southern Yemen under one national security sector. This adds to Riyadh’s ineffectiveness in establishing military-political influence in southern Yemen or in limiting the UAE’s continuing leverage. In an effort to boost its influence, since late 2022 Saudi Arabia has established new armed formations in Aden and nearby governorates, such as the Nation Shield Force.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
