Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting collapse of U.S. and European diplomatic relations with Moscow mean Syria diplomacy is now all but dead. Small signs that diplomacy may have been poised for renewed investment in early 2022 now feel like a distant memory.
Most of the reporting on Russian recruitment in Syria has involved half-truths, if not outright lies. While it does appear that some Syrians have signed contracts to fight in Ukraine, there is no guarantee these fighters will actually be sent there. The coverage of this topic has also missed a key aspect of who would actually be involved if Syrians really do deploy to Ukraine.
Doesn’t Russia’s egregious invasion of Ukraine look familiar? Whether it’s the flagrant attacks on civilians, the hospital bombings, siege tactics, or rampant disinformation, Ukraine’s parallels with Syria are just about everywhere one cares to look. However, yet another feature of Syria’s grueling war now appears set to be repeated amid reports that Russia is already recruiting Syrian fighters to join combat units on the frontlines in Ukraine.
On Feb. 7 and 8, France hosted the “Mediterranean Worlds Forum” in Marseille, following on the heels of the 2019 “Summit of the Two Shores, Mediterranean Forum.” These meetings have the stated goal of “giving new momentum” to relations in the western Mediterranean and illustrate Paris’s push to renew its leadership role in the region.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
While Syria diplomacy may have appeared poised for a period of renewed investment in early 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting collapse in U.S. and European diplomatic relations with Moscow mean Syria diplomacy is now all but dead. An unprecedented humanitarian crisis now appears to be imminent. To adapt to this new environment, the international community must consider a comprehensive change in approach, prioritizing the freezing of conflict lines and a more strategic use of aid, stabilization, and targeted rebuilding in areas free of Assad regime rule.
As Russia pushes on with its relentless invasion of Ukraine, Damascus has done more than toe the proverbial Kremlin line — it has shown complete solidarity with its superpower patron.
Sa’dallah Wannous revolutionized the Syrian stage with his existential, and often political, work. In the journal al-Ḥayāh al-Masraḥīyah he fostered discussions on art, politics and the future of Arab theater. Learn more about the Oman Library’s Digital Exhibition on his work.
يبدو أن الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا سيكون له تأثير عميق على سوريا والسياسة السورية. بداية، ربما تكون العملية السياسية التي تقودها الأمم المتحدة قد تعرضت الآن لضربة قاتلة. فطوال أشهر عام 2021، كان المبعوث الخاص للأمم المتحدة غير بيدرسون يمهد الطريق لإطلاق جهد دبلوماسي متعدد الأطراف أسماه “نهج خطوة بخطوة” في عام 2022. كانت احتمالات نجاحه ضئيلة دائمًا، لكنها تبدو الآن وكأنها أملًا كاذبًا أو مستحيلًا.
The past year has seen a trend toward normalization with the Assad regime, accompanied by a push by some nations to force or coerce displaced Syrians to return — or deny them asylum outright. The presumption that Syria is now safe for return is often motivated by political expediency and a false equivalency between “safety” and reduced military operations in a particular area, rather than an in-depth understanding of conditions on the ground and the challenges that returnees face. With pressures for return increasing, the Voices for Displaced Syrians and the Operations and Policy Center undertook a first-of-its-kind research project to establish the minimum frequency and types of violations experienced by returnees throughout the whole of Syria. Despite the known difficulties, the report aimed at obtaining an understanding of at least the minimum frequency with which violations occur, which is a critical step in discussions about return.
في العشرين من شهر كانون الثاني/ يناير، هاجمت مجموعات تابعة لتنظيم “داعش”، سجن الصناعة الواقع في الجهة الجنوبية لمدينة الحسكة أقصى شمال شرق سورية، الهجوم الذي أستمر لقرابة تسعة أيام، أنتهى بمقتل العشرات من مقاتلي التنظيم ومعتقليه داخل السجن، إضافة لمقتل قرابة 140 عنصراً من قوات سوريا الديمقراطية وحامية السجن التابعة لها.
On Jan. 20, 2021, groups affiliated with ISIS attacked al-Sina Prison in the southern part of the city of al-Hasakah, in Syria’s far northeast. The attack, which lasted for nearly nine days, ended with the killing of dozens of ISIS fighters and detainees inside the prison, in addition to approximately 140 members of the SDF and its prison guards.
Charles Lister and Mick Mulroy discuss the dramatic Feb. 3rd U.S. special operations raid that killed ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the group’s late January attack on the al-Sina prison, and ISIS’s broader trajectory in both Syria and Iraq.
The UAE has made bold strides to normalize relations with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, opening itself up to criticism as many countries remain reluctant to reconcile with Damascus. Despite this measured reintegration of Assad into the Arab fold, many serious complications and challenges lie ahead. The most important of these is the lack of support from a hesitant Saudi Arabia, which would impede the crucial next step of Syria’s restoration to full membership in the Arab League before its upcoming summit.
Intense fighting between the SDF and ISIS continued for the fifth day in Syria’s northeastern city of al-Hasakeh on Monday, following ISIS’s biggest attack in Syria and Iraq in three years. In the evening of Jan. 20, as many as 200 ISIS militants, many wearing suicide belts, launched a coordinated multi-axis assault on al-Sina Prison, shortly after detonating two car bombs parked along the exterior walls of its northern wing. In the chaos that ensued, SDF vehicles were seized and used to break through secure walls, clearing the way for hundreds of ISIS detainees to escape.