The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
In response to numerous comments from readers about his article “Lebanon’s inconvenient truths,” author Bilal Saab has published a brief rejoinder.
By any objective standard, the Lebanese protest movement has failed. This is not necessarily an indictment against it. Rather, it’s a reality one cannot and should not ignore. The responsible thing to do now is to try to understand why it has fallen flat, despite more than 100 days of demonstrations in various regions of the country including the capital, Beirut.
First, a word of solace. In the annals of history, the Lebanese are in good company as most uprisings and revolutions failed to attain their goals. And even when they did, success either didn’t last long or was completely reversed due to counterrevolutions and other spoilers, both foreign and domestic.
Against the backdrop of a massive economic and financial crisis and a now three-month-old nationwide protest movement, Lebanon swore in a new government on Tuesday — a technocratic cabinet that is widely seen as a “shadow government” for Hezbollah and other entrenched political leaders. MEI’s Paul Salem, Randa Slim, and Bilal Saab join host Alistair Taylor to discuss what lies ahead.
No amount of analytical nuance or ingenuity can challenge the conclusion that the newly formed government in Lebanon is Hezbollah’s creation. The only question left to answer is: why did Hezbollah do it?
The new government is politically aligned with the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian axis in Lebanon, and is very unlikely to drum up international and regional support.
Lebanon’s in trouble and the Lebanese may soon face the real reckoning that they’ve thus far avoided. Having bought time they’ve increasingly needed with money they’ve increasingly lacked, but somehow conjured, they’re running out of both. Its leaders must act, soon, to avoid a complete catastrophe. And, whether avoiding or coping with collapse, the Lebanese must well and truly consider how to shape a better future.
Introduced in August and subsequently delayed due to the country’s political upheaval, the National Lebanese Strategy for Cybersecurity is composed of two main sections: 1) preparation of a cybersecurity strategy and 2) establishment of a national cybersecurity agency.
The three uprisings in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon represent the revolt of a new generation seeking to build a better future for itself. Since 2011, there have been 11 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. All 11 uprisings have similar drivers: the explosive dysfunction of high demographic growth, low levels of economic development and job creation, poor government performance and services, and high levels of corruption and inequality.
Two months into the popular uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon, both countries are mired in a painful standoff.
While Hezbollah has largely remained immune to criticism, owing to its widely perceived role as an effective resistance movement against Israeli aggression, the powerful Iran-backed Shi’a militia and political party is now viewed by many demonstrators as part of the corrupt and morally bankrupt political establishment that must be replaced. Against this backdrop, supporters of Hezbollah and its Shi’a ally the Amal Movement have been quick to resort to violence.
Cities are commonly regarded as the primary places where class economies become layered and articulated; however, the debates on “urban humanitarianism” have neglected social class as a key factor that significantly marks the relationship between aid providers and recipients in settings of aid provision. The small city of Halba, in northern Lebanon, vividly illustrates how the class economy has tacitly been shaping humanitarian programming and how the very presence of humanitarian actors on the ground reinforced the pre-existing class-based inequality.
The nationwide protests are the most significant domestic political development in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. It would be useful to examine both the short and long term political potential of this new awakening.
In the short term, the protests have already mobilized the power of the public to bring down a corrupt and ineffective government, and to gain great leverage on the rejection or acceptance of any new government. They have also raised urgent national demands and forced the ruling class to confront these demands.
On a recent trip to my native Lebanon I looked on its ongoing, unprecedented protests with both wonder and worry. The country is a month into widespread anti-government demonstrations. The protests’ scale ebbs and flows but the relative calm during my stay had a fleeting if not sinister quality to it. That calm is unraveling. However this chapter of Lebanon’s history unfolds, this complicated country has changed irreversibly.
