Three years on, the intra-GCC dispute has taken a backseat but persists
How the current twin crises of the global coronavirus pandemic and economic collapse will affect the GCC governments remains an open question.
How the current twin crises of the global coronavirus pandemic and economic collapse will affect the GCC governments remains an open question.
While COVID-19 and historically low oil prices are disrupting the Gulf’s political economy, the pandemic has demonstrated the region’s tech resilience.
A perceived lessening of the U.S. security umbrella would leave the Saudis far more vulnerable regionally and could force additional policy adjustments.
This is only the latest flashpoint in a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting Qatar.
On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.
The best way to describe the Trump administration’s decision to remove Patriot missile defense systems from Saudi Arabia is by highlighting its military irrelevance and political significance.
The tensions between the two sides are unlikely to ease anytime soon.
Until a new round of UN talks begins, the cycle of violence on the ground is more than likely to continue.
President Vladimir Putin’s plans to change Russia’s Constitution and stay in power beyond 2024 have been hampered by COVID-19 and the oil price crash.
Despite the expressed Saudi aim of bringing about a respite in the fighting, there has been little change in the dynamics of the conflict.
The April 12 OPEC+ deal to cut oil production that ended the disastrous five-week Saudi Arabia-Russia price war is a short-term fix for the global industry, but will not resolve the larger problem of over-production. The price war heightened animosity between Riyadh and Moscow and calls into question whether the OPEC+ partnership will ever be the same again.
In an effort to boost its economic competitiveness, Qatar is hedging its bets on emerging technologies. The Gulf sheikhdom, eager to diversify its gas-dependent economy, is cultivating various technological areas, notably artificial intelligence (AI).
The Houthis’ lack of interest in halting their military operations could displace millions of civilians in the midst of a potential COVID-19 outbreak, defeating the very purpose of the cease-fire.
The Middle East is facing an unexpected turning point. The region will not look the same after COVID-19 as it did before it. The geoeconomics and geopolitics of the world are in free fall because of COVID-19, the oil price war, and a severe economic shutdown. For the Middle East and the Gulf monarchies in particular, the oil price war against Russia and U.S. shale and the shutdown of economies around the world have increased the pressure on the Gulf’s already-depleted financial resources, which usually act as a safety valve for the turbulent region.
Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to call for an urgent OPEC+ meeting was driven by a simple logic. In spite of its obvious advantages over other oil producers, the kingdom is still taking serious risks as it pursues an oil price war.