The delivery of the S-400 marked the most significant rupture in Turkey-U.S. ties in decades.
Given their territorial proximity, the regional actors of the Middle East have always had an interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a window to Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to Georgia’s isolation, and in the years since the country has gradually started reclaiming its historical role as a cultural and economic crossroads between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Turkey has completed the next-to-last piece of the 2,000-mile Southern Gas Corridor, a three-pipeline network that will send gas from Azerbaijan’s huge Shah Deniz field via Georgia and Turkey to Western Europe.
It was such a big deal that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia presided at the ribbon-cutting on Nov. 30. They were celebrating the completion of the pipeline that is the middle link in the Southern Gas Corridor: the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which traverses Turkey.
On Nov. 27 the GNA signed an MoU with Turkey seeking to create a shared maritime boundary in the Mediterranean Sea between southwestern Turkey and northeastern Libya. In an overt quid pro quo, this maritime agreement was signed along with a separate MoU to expand security and military cooperation. Thus, it seems clear that Turkey was only able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in exchange for increased security support for the GNA-aligned forces fighting the self-styled LNA in Tripoli.
NATO leaders will celebrate the 70th anniversary of their alliance in London on Dec. 3 and 4. Despite soft words from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, however, the alliance and Turkey are on a collision course.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a powerful driver of the development of existing and new Eurasian rail routes. A web of competing and complementary rail lines has begun to form across the Eurasian landmass. Railway cargo service between China and Europe has fast become a compelling “middle option” — cheaper than air and faster than sea.
Turkey’s relations with its Western allies are at an all-time low while its partnership with Russia is flourishing. Since Russia began delivery of its S-400 advanced aerial defense system in July, questions have abounded about Turkey’s future in the NATO alliance. Such concerns are not baseless. Turkey-Russia ties have never been closer. The two countries cooperate closely not only on energy and trade but also in the defense sector. But fears of a Turkish withdrawal from the alliance overlook the continued tension between Ankara and Moscow, which makes NATO an indispensable partner for Turkey.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington on Wednesday. While there are doubtless other items for discussion on the agenda, at the top of the list is, at least on Turkey’s side, Syria — or more specifically, what U.S. policy is and should be in Syria.
On Nov. 4 Daily Sabah, a strongly pro-government English-language daily in Turkey, published a scathing editorial with a title that says it all: “Al Jazeera English: A threat against the Turkey-Qatar alliance.” According to the editorial, Al Jazeera English slandered Turkey over its recent military incursion into northern Syria, and thus jeopardized the future of the Turkey-Qatar alliance. Given the close relationship between the Turkish government and Daily Sabah — and indeed the broader media environment in Turkey — it is highly unlikely that such a fiery editorial, which directly threatens Qatar, would have been published without a green light from “the palace.”
The following testimony was delivered before the U.S. Helsinki Commission at a hearing titled, “At What Cost: The Human Toll of Turkey’s Policy at Home and Abroad,” on October 31, 2019.
The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.
Damascus’ position is marginally stronger, and it is unlikely to concede anything of substance in Geneva despite continued American control of Deir ez-Zor’s oilfields.
Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.
While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.
That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.