اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Since the early years of the Syrian conflict, the Assad regime has systematically diverted local resources dedicated for reconstruction purposes to rehabilitate facilities in areas and sectors that benefit it and its inner circle, as well as placed the burden of rehabilitating properties onto Syrians themselves. To finance this policy, the regime has exploited four key resources, including imposing multiple reconstruction taxes, diverting U.N. and INGO early recovery and rehabilitation projects, capitalizing on local-led crowdfunding campaigns, and forcing Syrians to bear the cost of repairing their own damaged properties.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
Several foreign ministers gathered in an Asian capital to negotiate an end to regional turmoil. One of the countries represented at the meeting brokered an agreement to end hostilities between the others.
Another United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on continuing the resolution that allows Syria’s cross-border aid delivery is due in July, but the regime’s use of “consent” to allow an extra two crossings from Turkey into the area could be used to undermine the resolution’s necessity, which would risk destabilizing the conflict along with it. Twelve years of hard-won lessons show that until there is a broader political agreement with clear guardrails and guarantees, only a UNSC resolution that permits unimpeded humanitarian access to northwest Syria can secure the critical and consistent operational space required to meet the region’s growing needs as articulated by the NGOs working in the area.
It is too early to tell whether the Wagner “uprising” is a one-off or foreshadows further cracks and the eventual collapse of Putin’s presidency, but the latter outcome would have lasting consequences in the MENA region.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Despite a substantial growth in trade between China and Iran, especially when it comes to Chinese exports to Iran and purchases of Iranian oil, the same cannot be said for Beijing’s investments in the Iranian economy, which have remained anemic, particularly in the critical energy sector.
The prevailing political spirit in the Gulf region is presently one of de-escalation. In the case of the UAE and Iran, a number of existing connections could help hasten the process of de-escalation and enable it to happen faster than anywhere else in the region.The outcome should be of interest not only to the UAE and Iran but also to the U.S. given the latter’s long-standing efforts to shape Iranian policies.
While calls for the immediate return of Syrian refugees have increased at the regional and international levels, it is imperative to closely examine the direct link between the regime’s policy of property confiscation and the possibility of refugee returns. Property confiscation does not only impact the direct owners and their immediate families’ livelihoods but also hinders the ability of thousands of displaced Syrians to return while leading those who still reside under regime rule to consider migration.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
The “Axis of Resistance,” a network of non-state actors aligned with Iran, has emerged as a significant force in the Middle East in the last two decades. Despite the attention given to the more well-known members of the Axis of Resistance, the Azerbaijani group Hoseyniyun, which also operates within the network, remains relatively unknown.
In the 1950s-1970s, the bilateral relationship between Israel and pre-revolutionary Iran provided a road map for the process leading to a normalization in ties between the Jewish state and Arab countries in the 2020s.
The recent removal of IRGC commander Ali Shamkhani from his role as the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s top foreign and security policy body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), has triggered assessments about the potential implications for Tehran’s external calculus. But the changes at the SNSC should not be viewed in isolation. Rather, they must be understood and assessed in the context of a much deeper transformational project that began in 2019, personally spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Late last month, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opted to replace the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Shamkhani. The latter’s removal after 10 years spent in this key role has generated much speculation, misinformation, and outright disinformation.