In a politically significant statement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has asked the Afghan Taliban to “end the occupation of their brothers’ soil.” This follows a Taliban warning of severe consequences if Turkey were to remain in charge of security at Kabul Airport after the exit of American troops. Erdoğan’s message is likely to be interpreted differently by different stakeholders in the unfolding Afghan tragedy, a situation characterized by escalating violence, political uncertainty, and regional chaos.
While Western banks saw their valuations drop substantially during the first 18 months of the COVID pandemic — and have yet to recover — the declines among Saudi banks have been smaller and their valuations are now closer to, if not above, their pre-pandemic levels. Identifying the drivers of this seemingly contradictory trend helps us better understand the shifts within the Saudi banking sector and the growing impacts of policies related to Vision 2030, the country’s long-term economic development and diversification program.
Exploring the rising workforce participation among Saudi women
In the past few months, several articles have been written on the significant rise in the Saudi female labor force participation rate (LFPR) from 17.7% in Q2, 2016 to 33.2% in Q4, 2020. Interestingly, this increase in female LFPR was not coupled with a rise in unemployment, which often occurs when workforce participation rises for a particular group. In fact, the unemployment rate among female nationals declined to its lowest level in four years, at 24.4% in Q4, 2020. However, it still remains over twice as high as that for male nationals. Another positive labor market indicator, albeit one receiving little attention from analysts, is the significant change in the employment rate among Saudi women. In other words, Saudi women not only increased their share in the workforce, but were also able to gain jobs once they entered the labor force.
Singapore and the Gulf: Economic engagement beyond hydrocarbons
Oil and gas have long dominated trade and investment flows between Singapore and the Gulf. In the wake of two new projects — one in Singapore and the other in the United Arab Emirates — unveiled last month, this article considers whether Singapore and the Gulf are on the cusp of a new level and type of economic relations.
The Turkish government recently confirmed that the country has approved development plans to carve a new passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Cutting through forests and farmland, the new Canal Istanbul would run parallel to the Bosphorus for a total of 45 km (28 miles) with a depth of 20.75 meters (68 feet) and a width of 275-350 meters (900 to 1150 feet). Ground-breaking for the first bridge over the proposed canal is scheduled to take place on June 26. However, this will be a ceremony for domestic political consumption and by no means indicates that construction is really starting. Financing the massive project might prove impossible due to the environmental concerns and investment risks hanging over it.
The policy consequences of Arab state normalization with the Assad regime
The recent push by a number of Arab states to normalize relations with the Assad regime is based on the false premise that the war is over and it is necessary to restore ties to lobby Damascus to change its relationship with Iran. Other regional dynamics are also a factor: The UAE, for example, sees it as a necessary balance against what it perceives as adversarial actions by Turkey with the Syrian jihadist group HTS in Idlib. Yet these rationales for rehabilitating the Assad regime are completely fallacious. The downsides and policy consequences will not only affect Arab states, but will also harm American interests, making it difficult for the U.S. to fully pivot to address the rising threat from China.
The Growing Alignment Between the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean
The synergies between the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean theaters have grown substantially in recent years. Speaking at a meeting in Paphos, Cyprus in mid-April 2021 with his counterparts from Greece and Israel, as well as the former minister of state for foreign affairs of the UAE (now an advisor to the UAE president), the Cypriot foreign minister noted, “The evolving web of regional cooperation is creating a new narrative.” A week later, the UAE and Israeli fighter jets flew together publicly — for the first time — in an international aerial exercise hosted by Greece. How can we explain the signs of growing cooperation between these actors that seemingly operate in close but not completely overlapping arenas?
Cultural heritage diplomacy needs to be part of Biden’s Turkey outreach
In his statement commemorating the Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, President Joe Biden said, “We honor their story. We see that pain. We affirm the history. We do this not to cast blame but to ensure that what happened is never repeated.” Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, following similar steps by the House of Representatives and Senate in 2019, has strained U.S.-Turkish ties even further at a time when bilateral relations are at an all-time low. Although there is little room for reconciling Washington’s and Ankara’s conflicting takes on history, cultural heritage diplomacy offers the Biden administration a positive agenda to engage receptive stakeholders in Turkey to strengthen pluralism and social inclusion.
Eye on Niamey: Middle East regional powers vie for influence in Niger
Due to its relatively stable political institutions, geographic proximity to Libya, and UNSC seat, regional powers in the Middle East are competing for influence in Niger. Egypt and the UAE are trying to counter Turkey’s growing economic and security cooperation with Niger, Saudi Arabia and Iran wish to leverage its UNSC voting power, and Israel is testing the waters for a potential normalization of diplomatic relations. These rivalries are poised to intensify, as the Sahel’s geostrategic significance continues to expand.
On the margins of Vienna’s nuclear talks, Riyadh and Tehran have opened their own conversation in Baghdad. Despite predictions of a potential grand bargain, Saudi and Iranian identity security will confine the results to a mere cooling of relations, at best.
The rapidly growing state-supported arts infrastructure in Saudi Arabia tends to overshadow the lesser-known history of independent artist-led initiatives. The pioneering modernist Mohammed Alsaleem, for example, is known for establishing Dar Al Funoon Al Sa’udiyyah (The Saudi Art House) in Riyadh in 1979, the first space where artists could gather, work, mentor each other, and stage exhibitions at a time when there were no art schools or galleries. The Kingdom has gone through various stages in its cultural development from the 1960’s oil boom, a time of artistic productivity and government scholarships to study art abroad, to the tumultuous late 1970s of Islamic militancy and religious conservatism until the 2000s. “The 1960s was a time when art flourished in the Kingdom. In Riyadh, exhibitions by modernist painters were held in football clubs in order to engage the public,” says Raneem Farsi, an expert in Saudi Arabian contemporary art, of a time that has influenced her curatorial narrative. Along with Susan Davidson, former senior curator at the Guggenheim Museum, she is co-curator of the exhibition Light Upon Light: Light Art since the 1960s, which runs until June 12.
