Russia Needs an OPEC+ 2.0 Accord to Avoid a Crisis
President Vladimir Putin’s plans to change Russia’s Constitution and stay in power beyond 2024 have been hampered by COVID-19 and the oil price crash.
President Vladimir Putin’s plans to change Russia’s Constitution and stay in power beyond 2024 have been hampered by COVID-19 and the oil price crash.
When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the village of al-Baghouz in late
March 2019, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” came to an end. The largest multinational military
coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically rolling back ISIS’s control of an
expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq.
The April 12 OPEC+ deal to cut oil production that ended the disastrous five-week Saudi Arabia-Russia price war is a short-term fix for the global industry, but will not resolve the larger problem of over-production. The price war heightened animosity between Riyadh and Moscow and calls into question whether the OPEC+ partnership will ever be the same again.
President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has sought to dramatically reorient Turkey’s role and relationships in the region. Gradually at first but then abruptly, he has pivoted from the Republic’s historical status as a key member of the transatlantic alliance towards new partnerships – including Russia. Erdogan has consistently aimed for freedom in executing his foreign policy agenda, of which energy concerns are pivotal. It remains to be seen whether this hard-sought autonomy will be limited or expanded by Turkey’s domestic energy needs and its prime position as a hydrocarbon transit state.
Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.
Despite his support, al-Kadhimi’s path to obtain confirmation of his cabinet from the Council of Representatives is riddled with challenges.
The ingredients that fueled ISIS’s explosive expansion in Syria in 2013-14 are not only still present today, they are worse.
The new cuts will likely not do much to shore up oil prices.
Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to call for an urgent OPEC+ meeting was driven by a simple logic. In spite of its obvious advantages over other oil producers, the kingdom is still taking serious risks as it pursues an oil price war.
This Thursday, a postponed virtual meeting of “OPEC+ and Friends” will determine the level and seriousness of participation in a global oil pact.
Saudi Arabia declared a price war against Russia in early March to prove a point: that it can offer an unprecedented supply of 12.3 million barrels per day (bpd), way above the record 11 million bpd it reached in November 2018, and expand its market share at the expense of Moscow. As the coronavirus pandemic brings the world to a standstill, the question is how long it can sustain this war.
In active threat zones, the capacity to launch major operations will likely be constrained for at least several months once the virus begins its inevitable surge.
In the face of Algeria’s Hirak protest movement, the response of the EU so far has been measured, and it is notable that the EU’s calls for democratic reform are framed in economic terms that emphasize the benefits of greater economic integration between the states of the Maghreb. What opportunities do the ongoing changes in Algeria present for enhancing economic integration in the long term?
The outbreak of a Russian-Saudi oil price war earlier this month might offer some comfort to Iran, a country which has in recent years become unnerved by the increasingly close ties between Moscow and Riyadh. However, it is premature to see an Iranian geopolitical win emerging from the Russian-Saudi spat, and history should give Tehran plenty of reservations about Moscow’s ability to deliver on its economic promises to Iran. While Iran and Russia will likely continue to pay lip-service to the idea of an economic partnership, each side will remain preoccupied with larger concerns. This is a tale of unfulfilled economic potential.
Economies around the world are being battered by two “black swan” events at the same time: the COVID-19 virus and the oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are also affected, although each in different ways. Those that are net users of energy, which could have benefitted substantially from the vastly lower energy prices, are getting hit hard by COVID-19, while oil and gas producers are suffering from an all-out oil price war made worse by the steep decline in worldwide demand caused by the pandemic.