Research & Commentary Results

After a difficult year, things finally seemed to be looking up for Turkey’s beleaguered economy in early 2023. But then on Feb. 6 the worst happened: Turkey and Syria were hit by a pair of massive earthquakes, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and untold damage. How did Turkey’s economy stabilize in second-half 2022, what do we know about the economic impact of the earthquakes, and where might things be headed going forward?

In the center of Harem, Idlib, hundreds of Syrian families huddle around stoves and in tents as they look on at the row of collapsed apartments they used to call home. “This disaster hasn’t happened to Syria in a thousand years,” says Abu Ahmed, the director of the new camp. “The international community must witness what is happening to us and help.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hollowed out state institutions, placed loyalists in key positions, and enriched his cronies — paving the way for this tragedy.

The earthquakes that shook Turkey and Syria in the early hours of Feb. 6 represent a shocking human tragedy, with casualties already in the thousands. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, have been rendered homeless in the cold and wet of winter. There is no overstating the human suffering. This natural disaster is, at the same time, a clear political test for the current AKP-MHP government, one that will gauge its efficacy and legitimacy only months before critical elections, set to be held on May 14.

West Bank coordination is vital to Mahmoud Abbas’s and the Palestinian Authority’s survival. It’s also hugely unpopular among ordinary Palestinians.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

Southern Turkey and northern Syria were struck by a crippling 7.8 magnitude earthquake at 4:17 AM, on Feb. 6. Twelve hours later, at least 2,400 people are known to have perished, with death tolls rapidly rising. This natural disaster could not have come at a worse time or struck a more vulnerable region — with notoriously poor construction in southern Turkey and the effects of more than a decade of brutal conflict still afflicting northern Syria.

Netanyahu is skillfully building a set of menacing tools, mechanisms, capabilities, and policies that create a credible threat to the current order. Today, he is executing this strategy to achieve success on three key issues: annihilating the Oslo Accords and the two-state solution, curbing Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and carrying out what is effectively regime change in Israel. The U.S. must swiftly and decisively confront and foil Netanyahu’s destructive leverage vectors or else it will find itself on the wrong side of history on some or all of these three critical fronts.

For the first time in several months, Iranian critical military infrastructure again came under attack from an unknown assailant. The Jan. 28 drone attack on a Ministry of Defense workshop complex appeared designed to deliver a politico-strategic message. The strike may mark the beginning of a more unstable post-JCPOA security environment in the Middle East characterized by a return of deterrence and risk-taking behavior.

This week, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) concluded what it called on social media, “the largest ever U.S.-Israel combined exercise.” The drills reasserted U.S. support for partnerships, deterrence, and integration, despite posture reductions and continued concern among partners about Washington’s commitment to the Middle East.

A movement of Israelis who resist the new Netanyahu government is crystallizing and taking initial steps to push back against democratic erosion. It will need to evolve quickly and effectively to make an impact and could benefit from some international helping hands along the way.

A little over two weeks ago, the defense and intelligence chiefs of Turkey and Syria met face-to-face in Moscow — the first such meeting in over a decade. On the surface, this latest flurry of engagement with Assad’s regime is a major development. Were Turkey to decisively shift its Syria policy, the effects would be dramatic. Beyond the hype and speculation, Turkey’s decision to participate in the Moscow meetings is not altogether surprising and it does not represent a wholesale policy reversal. What has changed more recently is Turkey’s impending elections — and with them Erdoğan’s political calculations.

تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.

The challenge of developing export strategies for the offshore natural gas resources concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean predates the Russo-Ukrainian war. Yet over the course of 2022, Europe’s intensifying energy crisis created a new and more immediate incentive to solve those export challenges, despite a great deal of work still to be done.