Research & Commentary Results

Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.

It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?

For over a decade, Russia’s immediate neighborhood has been subject to the vagaries of the Kremlin’s cyber operations. Russia has effectively used cyberspace to advance its adversarial goals, be it through combining cyberattacks with military action during its war with Georgia, or targeting essential power grids in Ukraine. Advancing its cyber capabilities has enabled Russia to reassert its status as a superpower and hit targets anywhere in the world. In recent years, as the use of social media grew, the information war in cyberspace became the Kremlin’s primary tool for discrediting its perceived archenemy: “The West.” The Middle East, with its increasing dependence on social media for news, has also fallen prey to Moscow’s disinformation campaigns. Russia’s main disinformation narratives in the region stem from its Soviet-inherited superpower complex and its broader strategic imperatives on the international stage. 

We rarely miss an opportunity to criticize our Gulf Arab partners — sometimes rightly so — for not doing enough to safeguard collective interests. But one must acknowledge that on Afghanistan, and especially our just-completed exit from the country, most of our Gulf Arab partners absolutely shined. They deserve a ton of credit for the role they played in our large, challenging, and deadly evacuation — a role which was nothing short of indispensable.

Mick Mulroy and Ken Tovo join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent paper on how US intelligence and military operatives effectively collaborated with local Kurdish partners in Northern Iraq in the early 2000s, why it was a successful partnership, and what lessons it may provide for future operations. The paper, “Irregular Warfare: A Case Study in CIA and US Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03,” is available now on MEI’s website.

The failure of the Afghan army is a reminder that Pentagon-led security cooperation programs are more expensive and less effective than those led by spies.

A reinvigorated international approach to Yemen is possible. The current architecture for advancing a negotiated peace is being challenged by both international and local developments. The protracted nature of the conflict, the risk that it could worsen, and local political developments over the past two years necessitate a recalibration of the peace process, informed by realities on the ground, the urgent needs of the population, and the demand for security. Evolving coalition priorities, renewed U.S. engagement, and the appointment of a new U.N. special envoy may be an opportunity to advance conflict resolution. Achieving greater unity among southern actors will be key to the success of national-level talks and is urgently needed to prevent a further descent into violence, extremism, and humanitarian catastrophe.

Despite their unique characteristics and contexts, the Russian occupation of two regions in Georgia and its annexation of Crimea in Ukraine share a variety of similarities when it comes to the human rights situation on the ground.

Over the past decade, social media and communications platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp have emerged as important spaces for civil society, journalists, and everyday people in the Middle East to express themselves and organize. However, users’ experiences on these platforms often differ as platforms’ enforcement of their content policies varies by geography, language of use, and context. These flaws in the content moderation system can harm users residing in and around the Middle East, as well as those who use Middle Eastern languages such as Arabic.

At the dawn of the Biden era of American foreign policy, a more mature, realistic Saudi foreign policy is emerging to match the shifting signals from Washington. In some measure, the Saudis are readopting elements that traditionally characterized their policy preferences before the meteoric rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler.

Now as we watch this debacle unfold in our exit from Afghanistan, what lessons learned from Iraq should we apply today and is there still time? There are lessons learned from Iraq that are applicable in Afghanistan because although history does not repeat itself, it certainly rhymes a lot and yes, there is always time.

Since 1979 U.S. policies toward Iran have alternatively ranged from some version of “maximum pressure” to appeasement and back again while maintaining the same assumptions and calculus: the clerics would ultimately fall when the elite and middle class had enough and were willing to pay the price for revolting. Today, however, the landscape is evolving. While Iran’s leaders appear to be adapting, U.S. thinking is rooted in the past.

Suddenly and seemingly without warning, Russian forces amassed in Crimea and near the Ukrainian border in April 2021. Heavy armor, long-range missiles and artillery, modern air forces, and elite airborne infantry units deployed into positions that raised alarm in Ukraine and throughout Europe. The situation today appears stable, but reports of new and upgraded hardware, including unmanned vehicles, demand a fresh evaluation of the Russian way of war.

We can and must provide that assistance not to help defeat the Taliban, fix Afghanistan, or remove our moral stain, but to achieve a much more limited objective, one that’s stated by the President himself, which is to ensure that no major attack against the U.S. or U.S. strategic interests is launched from Afghanistan.

As the U.S. withdrew troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban pushed through large portions of the country, capturing strategic regional centers and ultimately securing the capital city of Kabul. In its pursuit, the Taliban faced relatively little resistance as it seized government strongholds. Rather than widespread fighting, reports indicate that Taliban fighters often cut deals with soldiers, offering payoffs or demanding surrenders. At the same time and as of the time of writing, the Taliban announced a general amnesty, encouraging former government officials and women to support the group.
Whether and how long this period of limited resistance and amnesty might last are unclear. What are the prospects for future political violence both within and outside the country?