Research & Commentary Results

When Bashar’s father Hafez al-Assad started his regime, the Makhloufs became key allies. This alliance deepened with Bashar’s rise to power, and the Makhloufs became increasingly entrenched in the system until they became its economic pillar. The house of Assad was the political arm of the regime while the house of Makhlouf was the economic and financial arm. But then it all fell apart.

Charities are useful fronts for all sorts of activities in Syria, but above all perhaps, they are vehicles of control. The Assads have long understood that the biggest danger to their rule comes from within, from a civil society that rejects their governance — never more so than today.

Of all the challenges to the OPEC+ effort, Iraq remains the biggest and most daunting.

Since 2017, Iran has seen several waves of protests rooted in political, social, and, most importantly, economic grievances. In light of COVID and the post-pandemic fallout, there is every indication that unrest will continue to grow, and even accelerate. Until now, the regime’s coercive apparatus has had both the capacity and the willingness of its members to successfully suppress anti-regime unrest. But has COVID-19 changed this balance? What impact, if any, has the pandemic had on the regime’s security capacity?

Conflict and instability have been constant features of the Middle East for decades. Over the most recent decade, four civil wars and fraught relationships between the major regional powers have been pushing the region toward a potentially perilous political and economic future. We know that the COVID-19 crisis is disrupting the status quo on nearly everything, including regional conflict. What we do not know is how that disruption today might worsen — or improve — the trendlines of those conflicts as we head toward 2025. In this MEI Strategic Foresight Initiative paper we employ a scenario-based methodology to explore this question.

Our ongoing analysis in MEI’s Strategic Foresight Initiative examines scenarios built around different combinations of drivers of change related to the COVID-19 pandemic. We used the scenarios to analyze what conflict in the region could look like in 2025, as we believe that how these drivers change the dynamics of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and the civil wars could be a primary determinant of what the region is like in that timeframe and beyond. Our study posited differences in the health response of governments, the economic response from governments, and the social dynamics of populations to the COVID-19 crisis. Rather than consider them as independent forces of change, our foresight analysis focuses on the interaction between these drivers.

The Syrian economy is entering its most fragile phase yet in the country’s nine-year-long conflict. After being devastated by the fighting, constrained by biting Western sanctions, and ravaged by widespread corruption, it is now witnessing the sharpest rise in inflation in its history.

As part of Beijing’s broader strategy of seeking out new markets and cultivating strategic partnerships with countries beyond its backyard, China has been seeking to expand its economic and political ties with Black Sea states. While Beijing’s involvement in the region is still at a nascent stage, it has already prompted fears that its economic engagement masks a political agenda that could hurt Western interests.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has had an unprecedented global impact. In many ways, everyone has been affected by this collective crisis, and everyone is at risk. However, both the virus and its aftermath discriminate strongly against women and girls.

Even as a growing number of Arab and African states look to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance to help counter the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic, Algeria has made it clear it will not follow suit. Despite the fiscal challenges, economic crisis, social unrest, and public health emergency, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has insisted that Algeria will not seek a loan to ease the country’s socio-economic woes.

COVID-19 is a humanitarian problem, and containing the pandemic as soon as possible is an urgent obligation to save human lives. Yet we have to deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic just as urgently because the costs are substantial.

The growing U.S. strategic reliance on India has fomented closer bilateral ties between China and Pakistan, straining the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

The lifting of lockdown restrictions could lead to a spike in cases for which the country is ill prepared.

The momentum of the BRI has lately slackened due to a variety of setbacks and disruptions. Until now, China has made headway in executing BRI-related projects in the Middle East despite such problems. Plummeting oil prices coupled with the onset of the worldwide public health and economic crises triggered by the covid-19 pandemic could result in scaled back plans and delayed implementation of BRI projects in the region. But China is not about to abandon the effort to extend the Maritime Silk Road to the Middle East — nor are its most avid regional partners. 

A possible influx of returnees from the Gulf swelling the ranks of the unemployed is bad enough, but it also comes with a serious complication — the possible loss of remittances.