The US pushes for Kurdish unity in Syria with Turkish hostility and future Syria talks in mind
The uncertain political circumstances this time around make these efforts worth watching.
The uncertain political circumstances this time around make these efforts worth watching.
With its territory under increasing pressure, its finances dwindling, and manpower more challenged than ever, HTS’s ability to balance its extremism with controlled uses of pragmatism is under strain. Internally, its leadership is bitterly divided over decisions of the past, present, and future and externally, its rivals and enemies all appear to be conspiring against it. In an attempt to protect internal cohesion, HTS has become determinedly self-assertive in recent weeks, pursuing unpopular policies such as trading with the regime and lashing out at those brave enough to express their dissatisfaction. In response to HTS aggressions, a wider array of opposition voices — both moderate and Islamist — are declaring loudly that HTS now represents a threat to their revolution.
Russia acts as a “key if quiet player” in southern Yemen, where its approach has been based on strategic neutrality. The goal has been to position Moscow as a greater stakeholder in mediation between the various Yemeni parties and outside players. Moscow has engaged the Southern Transitional Council, the UN-recognized Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Houthi rebels, as well as the three main regional powers intervening in Yemen — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.
On April 25, the Southern Transitional Council declared self-administration and claimed authority over state institutions in the interim capital of Aden. The declaration demonstrates the region’s volatility, the limited reach of Yemen’s government, and the difficulty of imposing a solution to the problem of secessionism. It is also sparking political competition for Saudi patronage, and all of this poses a major diplomatic challenge for the Saudis.
This precedent, along with the implementation of the Caesar Bill, guarantees the future isolation of the Syrian regime.
Until a new round of UN talks begins, the cycle of violence on the ground is more than likely to continue.
Basma El Husseiny (Action for Hope) and Samar El Yassir (Anera) join guest host Lyne Sneige to discuss the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on refugee communities and the NGOs that work with them.
Officially, Syria has just 42 COVID-19 cases, all but one of them in regime-held areas, as testing capacity is almost non-existent elsewhere. The actual number is certainly higher, but there appear to be few severe cases at the moment. Yet, interviews with doctors and NGO workers conducted over the phone and via messaging apps across all areas of control in Syria — from regime-held areas and the northeast to Idlib and the Turkish-controlled region — paint a grim picture of a health care sector utterly unprepared for a pandemic.
Despite the expressed Saudi aim of bringing about a respite in the fighting, there has been little change in the dynamics of the conflict.
When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the village of al-Baghouz in late
March 2019, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” came to an end. The largest multinational military
coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically rolling back ISIS’s control of an
expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq.
MEI senior fellows Mick Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich join host Alistair Taylor to discuss child soldiering, a growing global problem that has a disproportionate impact on the Middle East and Africa. Click here to read their new report, “Begin with the children: Child soldier numbers doubled in the Middle East in 2019.”
During the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, signaled that the Saudi-Houthi backchannel talks were not “ready to move to the highest level.” However, the situation changed following the Houthi ballistic missile attack on Jazan and Riyadh in late March, and on April 8, the coalition’s Joint Forces Command
Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.
The ingredients that fueled ISIS’s explosive expansion in Syria in 2013-14 are not only still present today, they are worse.
The Houthis’ lack of interest in halting their military operations could displace millions of civilians in the midst of a potential COVID-19 outbreak, defeating the very purpose of the cease-fire.