A solid defense needs a potent deterrent, which requires a credible offense.
As Syrians mark the 10-year anniversary of the 2011 uprising this week, it remains inescapably true that the country’s debilitating crisis is far from over. After a decade of conflict that was initiated and driven by an utterly ruthless regime and reinforced and diplomatically protected by its Russian and Iranian allies, Syria is broken.
It has been more than a month since the launch of military operations by Syrian regime forces and their allies, with air support from the Russian air force, in the Syrian Badia — the country’s expansive central desert region — in an attempt to eliminate ISIS cells deployed there. To date, however, these operations have not yielded any tangible results.
مضى قرابة الشهر على العمليات العسكرية التي تشنها قوات النظام السوري وحلفائها، بدعم جوي من الطيران الروسي في البادية السورية، في محاولة للقضاء على خلايا تنظيم “داعش” المنتشرة في تلك المناطق، لكن تلك الهجمات لم تُثمر عن نتائج تذكر حتى اللحظة.
الهجمات العسكرية للقوات المعادية للتنظيم لم تتغير على الصعيدين العملياتي والاستراتيجي، فقد اقتصرت على عمليات توغل لقوات برية بأسلحة خفيفة ومتوسطة، بغطاء جوي من طائرات حربية روسية تُمهد بعمليات قصف جوي، وطائرات مروحية مرافقة للقوات المتقدمة برياً تحسباً لهجمات التنظيم الدفاعية.
In a new policy briefing book, entitled The Biden Administration and the Middle East: Policy Recommendations for a Sustainable Way Forward, MEI scholars tackle a large number of country-specific and region-wide issue areas, laying out both the abiding U.S. interests and specific recommendations for Biden administration policies that can further U.S. interests amid a region in turmoil.
On Feb. 4, President Joe Biden announced the end of U.S. support for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s offensive military operations in Yemen. This decision fuelled optimism about a U.S. return to negotiations over the JCPOA with Iran. Instead of engaging with the United States, Iran has supported the Houthi-orchestrated Marib offensive and stepped up its diplomatic efforts in Yemen.
Note: The below event was hosted by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law on March 4, 2021. Please find more information here.
The understandings reached between Washington and Jerusalem half a century ago establish the critical context for the Biden administration’s current effort to restore the JCPOA, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fiercely opposed during its adoption by the U.N. Security Council in July 2015 and which he still bitterly contests today.
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to make available to the public a keynote address by Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which kicked off the first MEI-CENTCOM Annual Conference. In the pivotal moment of a new U.S. administration, amid major changes in the region including the signing of the Abraham Accords and the incorporation of Israel into CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, Gen. McKenzie joined MEI Senior Vice President Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein in conversation to address key issues and build on his June 2020 discussion with MEI President Paul Salem on CENTCOM’s approach to a changing Middle East.
The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.
Earlier in February, Iran’s minister of intelligence, Mahmoud Alavi, signaled that if the U.S. continues provoking the country, Tehran might lash out like a “cornered cat” and consider the nuclear option. Will Joe Biden’s late reentry into the JCPOA and the expected resulting increase in tensions influence Iran’s strategic logic on nuclear weapons? A look back at the history of Iran’s decision making on the issue suggests that shifts in military threat assessments are as important as technical developments when it comes to Tehran’s nuclear strategy.
There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.
The Lebanese Hezbollah has long been one of the Middle East’s most dangerous actors, and it has deeply embedded itself in Lebanon’s political system and economy. The Middle East Institute’s Bilal Saab details the different relationships the group has with various Lebanese constituencies and explains why some might begin to fray in the months to come.
Background – China and Russia relations
On Feb. 3, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hosted his Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi in Moscow. After their meeting, Lavrov emphasized Russia and Jordan’s shared positions on Syria, Gulf security, and Israel-Palestine.