Panel I: Forging A Viable Political PathModerator: David Rothkopf, Foreign PolicyKhalil al Anani, Middle East Institute Graeme Bannerman, Middle East instituteKarim Haggag, National Defense UniversityTarek Masoud, Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
Introductory RemarksAmb. Wendy ChamberlinPresident, Middle East Institute
Introductory RemarksAmb. Wendy ChamberlinPresident, Middle East Institute
Introductory RemarksAmb. Wendy ChamberlinPresident, Middle East Institute
Introductory RemarksAmb. Wendy ChamberlinPresident, Middle East Institute
Introductory RemarksAmb. Wendy ChamberlinPresident, Middle East Institute
Much of the analysis on the causes for the military’s ouster of Mohamed Morsi focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood’s performance, or lack thereof, in domestic affairs. Glaringly absent, however, is an examination of the preeminence of Sinai in the military’s decision to intervene in otherwise civilian political disputes between the burgeoning liberal parties and the veteran Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies.
The situation in Libya one year after the attack on the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi on September 11, 2012 is chaotic, dysfunctional and disheartening. It remains not as abjectly horrible as it could be—the General National Congress did this summer finally approve a framework (however imperfect) for electing a constitutional assembly, and UN-backed efforts are under way to create an unofficial dialogue of national reconciliation—but these advances paper over ever-deeper failings, many of which were not inevitable.
Egyptians call their desert country “the protected” (al-mahrousa) in homage to its longevity and the idiosyncratic features that have consistently saved it from destitution: a geostrategic location, Nile-fed farmland, and a stunning array of in situ antiquities. While much has remained unchanged in Egypt since the 2011 uprising, including the authoritarian nature of its government, alarming quantities of the country’s precious agricultural and archeological land have been vanishing to make way for cheaply-built homes of low-income citizens.
When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and his foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, issued unequivocal pledges of support for Egypt’s military government and its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, their move was widely depicted in the news media as a logical extension of the kingdom’s opposition to revolutionary movements in the Arab world. This simplistic view overlooks the fact that Saudi Arabia has responded differently to different uprisings—it supports the rebels in Syria, helped to crush them in Bahrain—and that aligning itself with Egypt’s new rulers could be a risky strategy.
This article first appeared in Al-Monitor.
The ongoing confrontation between Egypt’s military and the Muslim Brotherhood has left the country in deep disarray.
The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome H.E. Ambassador Raouf Adly Saad, former special envoy to Africa of the interim president of Egypt, for a conversation about Egypt’s political transition and future. In light of Egypt’s many challenges, Ambassador Saad will discuss the transitional government’s goals and priorities and offer his insights about how to get Egypt on a path toward economic stability and democracy.
This article originally appeared in The Christian Science Monitor
The American relationship with Egypt needs to change if Washington wants to have substantive influence in Cairo. America’s recent strategy in Egypt has been focused on buying Egyptian compliance through military and economic aid, but it seems to have had little effect.
With the dual announcement this week of the completion of a preliminary constitutional draft by a ten-member committee of experts, in addition to appointments to the quasi-governmental National Council on Human Rights, Egyptians finally have reason to be cautiously optimistic.