Research & Commentary Results

The satellite images published on May 26 by AFRICOM appear to confirm reports that Russian MiG-29 jet fighters had flown to Libya. In fact, the MiG-29s travelled to Libya via Russia’s Hemeimeem air base in Syria, and as this latest episode makes clear, Hemeimeem plays a central role in Russia’s growing involvement in both the Mediterranean and Africa.

Absent major military escalation by his foreign patrons, Khalifa Hifter has now lost the war he initiated against Libya’s internationally recognized government in Tripoli. The question remains, however, of how to end Libya’s proxy war and restart the necessary political process to bring about sustained peace.

As the May 26 AFRICOM statement makes clear, Russia’s strategy is fraught with the risk of new sanctions and its geopolitical maneuvers may not come for free.

COVID-19 is a humanitarian problem, and containing the pandemic as soon as possible is an urgent obligation to save human lives. Yet we have to deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic just as urgently because the costs are substantial.

The recent deployment of Syrian army Fourth Division troops to Daraa is yet another reminder of the deadly unrest ongoing in southwestern Syria. Sent to pacify Mazayreeb following an unprecedented armed attack after which several soldiers were publicly executed, Daraa’s western countryside still regularly witnesses violent unrest including assassinations, hit-and-run attacks, and drive-by shootings.

With the recent move, 45 out of the 65 HDP-run municipalities have been placed under state-appointed trustees.

Syria faces long-standing economic problems that have been greatly exacerbated by its nine-year-long war. The cost of rebuilding the country will be enormous. But before there can be any discussion of sanctions relief or economic assistance, key political and economic reforms must be implemented. First and foremost among these is the devolution of power to the most local level of governance.

Arguably the time is now ripe to begin accumulating such nuances in regard to Turkey. The difficulties of dealing with Turkey and President Recep Erdogan are incontestable and well-known. Nevertheless, Turkey’s geopolitical significance is equally indisputable and far-reaching.  Many of the major issues in European security – migration, Libya’s civil war, confronting Syria’s civil war (the equivalent in our time of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s), stabilizing the Balkans, defending the Black Sea, European energy security, and in particular accessing the energy in the Eastern Mediterranean – would benefit from the restoration of a true and ongoing strategic dialogue with Turkey. Indeed, neither we nor Turkey can make progress on them without such a dialogue.

Saying that Moscow is having a change of heart at this very moment, let alone is willing to publicly broadcast this to Damascus, may be a bit premature.

The central bank has depleted its reserves dramatically by funding state bank interventions in defense of the lira.

On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.

In recent weeks, a flurry of commentary from prominent voices and publications in Russia has seen a wave of criticism directed at Syria’s Assad regime. Accusations have been leveled against the regime of corruption, warlordism, and incompetence, as well as an obsession with achieving unrealistic military objectives at the expense of dwindling resources, reconstruction, and political and economic reforms.

In a series of videos posted on Facebook this week, Rami Makhlouf called out the upper echelons of Syria’s political establishment, of which he had been an integral part for over two decades. By making his feud public Makhlouf has created an unprecedented rift within loyalist ranks, transforming his dispute with Syria’s ruling elite from one that was tightly controlled and behind closed doors to an out in the open, nationwide row the likes of which haven’t been seen since Hafez al-Assad’s standoff with his brother Rifaat in 1984.

Officials in Damascus say reconstruction plans for what was once Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee community will pave the way for the return of large numbers of displaced residents “as soon as possible.” But with plans beset by delays and vague statements from those same officials, the available evidence suggests otherwise.

The fact that Makhlouf chose to go public heightens the stakes at play at the top of the regime and within the Alawite clan, arguably more than ever.