Research & Commentary Results

Around the world, there is ongoing debate over the extent to which speech should be regulated for the common good. Facebook has been a key battleground in this debate. Indeed, since nearly its founding day, the company has struggled with the degree to which it bears responsibility for the content that its users post on the platform, including but not limited to, the glorification of violence, incitement to terrorism, and false and misleading political content. In 2020, the company officially launched the Facebook Oversight Board, a trust-based body composed of 40 members and tasked with passing final, binding rulings upon Facebook’s content moderation decisions.

President Joe Biden’s commitment to “stepping up” diplomacy to end the war in Yemen generated hope among peace practitioners and policy shapers. In February, the president appointed Tim Lenderking, a seasoned diplomat with solid experience in the region, as the U.S. special envoy to Yemen.

On Dec. 14, 2020, the Trump administration sanctioned Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), along with key individuals involved in the purchase of the Russian–made S-400 surface-to-air missile system. The sanctions were issued under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law intended to punish Russia for a wide range of malign activities.

الرغم من مرور أكثر من عامين على تحرير مخيم الباغوز في محافظة ديرالزور، والذي كان آخر معاقل تنظيم “داعش” في سورية، ومحاولات التحالف الدولي وحليفته الإدارة الذاتية ارساء الاستقرار في مناطق شرق الفرات ومنع عودة التنظيم إلى واجهة الأحداث، إلا أن التنظيم لازال يمارس نشاطه وعملياته الأمنية في المنطقة، والتي تشهد تزايداً ملحوظاً مع مرور الزمن خاصة في العامين الأخيرين.

At the end of Joe Biden’s first 100 days as president of the United States, where do things stand when it comes to U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa? We asked experts and scholars from across MEI to weigh in with their thoughts on the changes we’ve seen so far, the new challenges that have emerged, and what we know about the administration’s key priorities for the region. 

It’s easy to see why there’s an enduring attraction for a regional security dialogue in the Middle East. Countries in the region face shared and borderless challenges — including terrorism, insurgency, environmental safety, arms races, cybersecurity, maritime piracy, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — that can be dealt with more effectively through multilateral measures.

“في حين أنه من المفهوم أن نرغب في عودة كافة قواتنا إلى الوطن، فلا ينبغي أن يكون ذلك على حساب خسارة ما حاربنا لكي نربحه”.

The response of the Russian government to the Arab uprisings that began in January 2011 has aimed primarily at protecting its interests in the Middle East, including security and economic objectives.[1] Nonetheless, it has pursued different approaches over time: an initial period of observation and political pressure between 2011 and 2015, followed by more active policies thereafter. This essay explains the reasons for this shift and argues that Russia’s policies since 2015 are likely to continue, despite domestic and external challenges.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is a close partnership founded on shared national security interests as well as democratic values. Washington’s commitment to the security and wellbeing of the state of Israel is exceptional, and bilateral ties remain strong despite the erosion of support for Israel among progressive and isolationist circles in the U.S. In spite of all this, the Iran issue presents many pitfalls for miscalculation that could derail even the most well-intended efforts at formulating a coordinated U.S.-Israel strategy.

Five months into his job as commander of regime forces in Deir ez-Zor, Maj. Gen. Nizar Khader appears to have skillfully gained control over the diverse tapestry of loyalist forces in the region. Khader’s return to power in the east quickly put an end to the deadly disputes that had plagued the governorate’s security forces for years. He then launched a nearly three-month campaign, coordinated between Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, to push ISIS cells back into the province’s hinterlands, securing the crucial highway connecting Deir ez-Zor with Palmyra and Damascus to the west. His success, while impressive, will face its second major test soon as ISIS prepares for a potential Ramadan offensive.

Under mounting pressure to define and execute its foreign policy to “restore U.S credibility,” the Biden administration needs to carefully consider its focal points in the Middle East, especially in light of the region’s recent realignment following the signing of the Abraham Accords. Luckily, through cyber diplomacy and norm setting, the administration can restore its credibility without abandoning its core ideals, while also nurturing relationships in the Middle East and beyond. Such cyber diplomacy could involve both engaging with partners to strengthen rules-based frameworks around acceptable state behavior in cyberspace and using cyber to leverage wider diplomatic aims.

When headlines flashed this month about the Peshawar High Court’s decision in Pakistan to yet again ban the controversial video-sharing app TikTok, you might have been tempted to scroll away in boredom. After all, who hasn’t banned TikTok these days?

Close observers of policy trends in the GCC will notice that digital transformation and data governance are becoming vital issues in the region. Over the last decade, Gulf countries have introduced ambitious plans to digitally transform their public and private sectors, with the goal of providing reliable, rapid, and efficient public and private services.

Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) is the U.S. military’s name for the international intervention to defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq starting in 2014. While OIR has been a success, it has necessarily been imperfect. Throughout the campaign, cost-benefit calculations made by policymakers led to missed opportunities and possibly a longer conflict. These decisions will have lasting repercussions that could undermine the hard-won victory against ISIS, as well as the ability to partner in future interventions. In particular, the United States mishandled its partner relationships in the war to defeat ISIS. Political considerations apparently won out against supporting and sustaining the SDF, our military partner forces.