The U.S. and LAF have a mutual interest in maintaining U.S. security assistance.
Nine years of conflict in Syria has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on regional and international security. Although overarching dynamics have changed, the crisis is far from over — it is merely evolving. All of the conflict’s root causes remain in place and many have worsened. In controlling less than two-thirds of the country, the Syrian state and its Russian and Iranian backers are increasingly incapable of addressing the many challenges they face: economic collapse and inflation, fledgling insurgencies, a resurgent ISIS, a COVID crisis, and endemic corruption and mismanagement. What happens in Syria never stays in Syria. The United States cannot afford to prematurely withdraw or sustain today’s inconsistent and ill-considered policy — it must step up, re-assert its leverage, strengthen its partners, mobilize its allies, and move determinedly toward protecting American interests and helping to diplomatically resolve the crisis once and for all, creating space for foreign actors, the U.S. included, to depart Syrian soil responsibly.
In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward.
On Feb. 16, 2015, then British Ambassador to Yemen Jane Marriott wrote an article titled “Yemen: the ball is in the Houthis’ court,” asserting that the future of the country and its stability were dependent on the Houthis.
Moscow has been scaling down its activities in eastern Syria and the most likely reason for this inertia lies in Moscow’s reluctance to be associated with actors seeking to erode the quasi-autonomy of the Trans-Euphrates region. Instead, Russia prefers to stand to the side and watch events unfold, while contemplating the right moment to jump in as a mediator and reap the political rewards.
Soldiers refuse to stand with protesters amid growing criticism from Hezbollah.
The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.
No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.
When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.
The Israelis and Hezbollah are at it again. Earlier this week, they seem to have skirmished in the Shebaa Farms area. In their latest exchange of fire, or fiery statements, Israel and Hezbollah are continuing a new tradition of contained conflicts — one stretching back five years, when the Israelis stepped up efforts to interdict weapons shipments, destroy infrastructure, and kill Iranian or Iranian-supported officials and fighters in Syria (and indeed Iraq).
I don’t understand why Iran’s Revolutionary Guards insist on conducting military exercises in the Gulf waters that are as devoid of credibility as they are comical. Because if the goal of these drills is to intimidate or change the calculations of the U.S. Navy, nobody is flinching or losing any sleep in the Bahrain-headquartered U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, or NAVCENT.
If elected, Joe Biden and his administration will face a wide range of foreign policy challenges. Possibly none will be more vexing than what to do about the clerical regime in Iran.
With allies and direct lines to Beijing, Washington must do more to keep China’s presence in the region from becoming a threat.
HTS launched multiple raids on SBS, forcing its factions to close their military bases and banning the formation of any new factions or operations rooms. In doing so, it has killed two birds with one stone: demarcating new redlines for its rivals and demonstrating its usefulness to its Turkish “partner” and the international community in their war on terrorism.
Over the past decade, the two main pillars of Lebanon’s stability have been the country’s army and its banking sector. Today one of those pillars — the banking sector — has all but fallen and Lebanon is standing on one leg: its army.