حكومة التغيير في إسرائيل: اكتملت ولكن لم تتحقق بعد
“لاتزال ثمة عقبات خطيرة محتملة على المدى القريب أمام تشكيل حكومة إسرائيلية جديدة”
“لاتزال ثمة عقبات خطيرة محتملة على المدى القريب أمام تشكيل حكومة إسرائيلية جديدة”
There is only one thread holding together the unprecedentedly disparate parties that will establish and support the nascent Israeli government announced on the night of June 2, an hour before the midnight deadline. That thread is, of course, a shared loathing for Benjamin Netanyahu. Whether that thread will even get the new government past its first hurdle, which is a vote of confidence in the Knesset, much less to its theoretical four years, is an open question. Until recently no one could have imagined such a political monstrosity might be conceived, let alone gestated, but there’s a decent chance this government will get off the ground.
“دعاوي أردوغان للهيمنة على ساحة تقسيم لها معنى رمزي”.
The recent push by a number of Arab states to normalize relations with the Assad regime is based on the false premise that the war is over and it is necessary to restore ties to lobby Damascus to change its relationship with Iran. Other regional dynamics are also a factor: The UAE, for example, sees it as a necessary balance against what it perceives as adversarial actions by Turkey with the Syrian jihadist group HTS in Idlib. Yet these rationales for rehabilitating the Assad regime are completely fallacious. The downsides and policy consequences will not only affect Arab states, but will also harm American interests, making it difficult for the U.S. to fully pivot to address the rising threat from China.
“إن استعداد مجلس حقوق الإنسان لإنشاء لجنة دائمة ذات تفويض شامل يشير إلى مدى التغيير في التصورات الدولية للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني في السنوات القليلة الماضية”.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
The recent round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, and especially the events that preceded it in Jerusalem, were the first significant test of the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements signed in 2020. Saved by Hamas’ intervention, the four normalizing Arab governments were nevertheless forced to address the consequences of their agreement in the face of popular discontent with the situation at home as well as criticism from other Arab and Muslim states over their relative silence. How they respond to the evolving Israeli-Palestinian tension going forward will be critical not only in regard to their own relations with Israel but also in terms of the future path of Arab-Israeli normalization.
The synergies between the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean theaters have grown substantially in recent years. Speaking at a meeting in Paphos, Cyprus in mid-April 2021 with his counterparts from Greece and Israel, as well as the former minister of state for foreign affairs of the UAE (now an advisor to the UAE president), the Cypriot foreign minister noted, “The evolving web of regional cooperation is creating a new narrative.” A week later, the UAE and Israeli fighter jets flew together publicly — for the first time — in an international aerial exercise hosted by Greece. How can we explain the signs of growing cooperation between these actors that seemingly operate in close but not completely overlapping arenas?
The Gaza war and violence against Arabs within Israel may slow investment from the Gulf.
In his statement commemorating the Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, President Joe Biden said, “We honor their story. We see that pain. We affirm the history. We do this not to cast blame but to ensure that what happened is never repeated.” Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, following similar steps by the House of Representatives and Senate in 2019, has strained U.S.-Turkish ties even further at a time when bilateral relations are at an all-time low. Although there is little room for reconciling Washington’s and Ankara’s conflicting takes on history, cultural heritage diplomacy offers the Biden administration a positive agenda to engage receptive stakeholders in Turkey to strengthen pluralism and social inclusion.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
In March 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum held its first meeting as a recognized international organization. Delegations from member countries – including Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine – gathered in Cairo to organize a regional gas market. The forum is a unique space that offers a platform for dialogue between European and Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, it is rare that Israeli and Palestinian delegations cooperate on the international stage. Yet, as the inaugural meeting demonstrated, the conflict is never too far away. When the delegates voted on whether to grant the United Arab Emirates observer status in the forum – a privilege given to the United States and European Union – Palestine vetoed, a clear demonstration of Ramallah’s frustration with the normalization process that started a few months ago.
While riots and even violent military clashes between Israel and the Palestinians are unfortunately nothing new, and the conflict itself has been of interest to the international community for many decades, the recent, sudden escalation in violence has come as a surprise to many outside observers. This has forced individual states and international organizations to take a stance on what’s happening, including the EU. For the EU, the Middle East conflict is one of the greatest challenges in the immediate neighborhood and a major factor hindering the implementation of its European Neighborhood Policy in the eastern Mediterranean.
Due to its relatively stable political institutions, geographic proximity to Libya, and UNSC seat, regional powers in the Middle East are competing for influence in Niger. Egypt and the UAE are trying to counter Turkey’s growing economic and security cooperation with Niger, Saudi Arabia and Iran wish to leverage its UNSC voting power, and Israel is testing the waters for a potential normalization of diplomatic relations. These rivalries are poised to intensify, as the Sahel’s geostrategic significance continues to expand.
“على عمرو أن يطمئن الفلسطينيين بأن إدارة بايدن جادة في معالجة مخاوفهم، خاصة فيما يتعلق بالوضع في القدس”.