Research & Commentary Results

Are the treaties with the UAE and Bahrain in any way comparable to previous genuine milestones, like the agreements with Egypt and Jordan? Can we realistically see them as helping to lead the way to a brighter future, at least as far as Israel’s conflicts with its neighbors are concerned? The answer is almost certainly “not really.”

Fourteen years after the Palestinian pro-Islamist group Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2006, Palestinians may finally be returning to elections as a mechanism to resolve their differences and to present a unified legitimate national leadership. In a sign of progress toward reconciliation, Palestinian leaders met in person and over teleconference on September 3 and vowed to address threats to the Palestinian national movement. Most recently, President Abbas, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, declared that presidential elections would take place soon.The question now will be whether a unified Palestinian policy, means of accomplishing it, and a new leadership can be born in the coming six months.

Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.

In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?

For the last five years, the international community has tried a range of different approaches to mediating the Libyan civil war. All have failed. Most nations not actively fueling the war with weapons, money, training, and mercenaries now see that halting these destructive flows is critical to bringing the rival militias to the negotiating table. However, this will not be enough to solve the conflict. Once militias are cut off from external sources of support, the core economic issues that gave rise to the conflict will still remain. Only a new approach empowering Libyan economic reformers and reworking the economic system can fix the dysfunction. To achieve this, international actors need to facilitate the establishment of a Libyan-led International Financial Commission with the authority to restructure the economy.

Since 2011 Libya’s seemingly endless Wars of Post-Gadhafi Succession have not fundamentally been fought over the control of territory, but rather over the control of economic institutions, patronage networks, and the amorphous optics of legitimacy and international support. The most recent battle, the 2019-20 “War for Tripoli,” was about gaining access to the fonts of both legitimate and corrupt enrichment: letters of credit, smuggling networks, subsidized petrol, and control of those myriad institutions to which Libya’s sui generis economic system grants the ability to exert de facto fiscal, financial, and legal power. Therefore, although Hifter and his allies have been wholesale evicted from western Libya, the grievances they highlighted, preyed upon, and took advantage of remain unchanged.

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) took a different path than the rest of the financial world. As markets around the globe plunged, the TSE soared to new heights. There has been a recent reversal, however, with the index falling sharply from its peak in early August and losing around 20 percent of its value over the course of a month. The story of the TSE is about the extreme measures a desperate government is willing to take to make ends meet. 

A March 2018 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research showed that satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmoud Abbas stood at 33 percent; 68 percent of the public wanted him to resign; and had elections been called, he would most likely have lost his presidency to a rival from Hamas.Nearly two and a half years later, however, and Abbas’s political fortunes have been restored, thanks in large part to the Trump administration and the United Arab Emirates

In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward. 

Countries in the Horn of Africa can draw lessons from the Taiwanese because they are themselves attempting to make the same political transition Taiwan did, but have not yet achieved the needed reforms such as ensuring good governance, eradicating corruption, and developing economic self-reliance to reduce dependency on aid. Taiwan may not have the financial resources to win against the PRC’s checkbook-driven One-China policy in Africa, but it could overcome that disadvantage by convincing African nations that it can help them replicate the sustainable growth model of the “Taiwan Economic Miracle.” Taiwan’s recent diplomatic overtures in Somaliland seem like a step in that direction and could be a game-changer, not only for the Horn of Africa but for the continent as a whole.

Following the devastating explosion that rocked Beirut on Aug. 4, one of the first foreign state dignitaries to visit Lebanon to pledge support was Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay. Oktay said that not only would Turkey help to rebuild the damaged port and the surrounding buildings, but it could also provide temporary support in the form of linking Turkey’s largest Mediterranean port, Mersin International Port, with the Port of Beirut.

The explosion at the Port of Beirut on Aug. 4 has resulted in a further escalation of the political and economic crisis in Lebanon. Its repercussions can already be deeply felt in neighboring Syria and are expected to take an even greater toll on the country given its complex links to Lebanon. This crisis is feeding into Syria through multiple channels and has severe implications for its ability to import goods and, ultimately, its food security.

The Jordanian government implemented one of the most comprehensive and effective COVID-19 responses in the region. While the government’s stringent measures did prompt some public discontent, the population largely accepted them. The government’s rapid and broad initial response was successful in thwarting a major public health crisis. Nevertheless, the kingdom has not been able to forestall the damaging economic consequences of COVID-19, which are bound to linger for years to come.

On Aug. 14, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. International reactions to this historic deal were sharply polarized, but the two main strategic rivals of the United States, Russia and China, responded cautiously to the announcement.