Research & Commentary Results

The Egyptian revolutionary motto, “bread, freedom, social justice,” which echoed over 18 days until Hosni Mubarak’s ouster on February 11, 2011, illustrated how restricted access to food had become one of the people’s main grievances. In the aftermath of the revolution, infused by a renewed sense of ownership of their country, many citizens launched environmental initiatives with a focus on sustainable agriculture.

In early 2011, Yemeni youths took to the street to demand the downfall of the regime and much-needed democratic reforms. This eventually led to the removal of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh from power later the same year. The political turmoil associated with the uprising has resulted in an alarming deterioration of the security situation throughout the country, most notably the seizure of two major cities in the southern governorate of Abyan by Ansar al-Shariah (AAS), an offshoot of al-Qa`ida. Backed by the Yemeni government, the Popular Committees (PCs), local armed resistance groups, pushed AAS out of major cities in Abyan.

This paper discusses attempts at reconciliation that followed Taiwan’s transition to democracy after four decades (1947–1987) of political repression in which new settlers from the Chinese mainland, known as waishengren (provincial outsiders), suppressed a native population, known as benshengren (provincial natives), that had formerly experienced 50 years (1895–1945) of Japanese colonial rule. As a case study, I draw on field research undertaken between 2004 and 2006 in the village of Luku. I ask to what extent Taiwan has redressed the defining massacre that occurred on February 28, 1947, known as the 2-28 Incident, and the repression that followed, known as the White Terror (1949–1986). To what extent can Taiwan be sure that state terror will not recur? Further, what lessons are there for the “Arab Spring?”

Between 1998 and 2003 the Melanesian archipelago state of the Solomon Islands was marked by a violent civil conflict precipitated by a combination of ethnic tensions, economic insecurities, and perceived injustices. Known colloquially as “The Tensions,” the low-intensity conflict left around 200 people dead and more than 11,000 displaced from their homes. In addition, more than 5,700 human rights violations were committed during the conflict, of which at least 1,413 involved torture. Although its transition has not been from authoritarian rule to democracy, the Solomon Islands’ attempts to address the human rights violations that took place during this conflict hold a number of important lessons for the transitional states of the Middle East.

Since the “Arab Spring,” international actors have considered Tunisia an exemplar of democratic transition in the Arab world. But this optimism is increasingly being replaced by fear and frustration, especially within Tunisia itself. Transitional justice—dealing with the crimes committed by previous regimes—is one of the subjects of debate.

In December 2012, the Central Bank of Egypt announced that the country’s foreign reserves had reached an alarming low of $15 billion, less than 50 percent of its holdings following Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. At that point, the Bank was no longer capable of providing the treasury with the monthly dollar transfers necessary for the purchase of basic food and energy imports, and thus had to rely on foreign borrowing to cover these imports and debt service as well as to support local currency.

Testimony by MEI’s Paul Salem before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, delivered February 25, 2014.  Find more information here about the hearing, including full video (Salem’s testimony begins at 1:22:40).

Economist Zubair Iqbal explains the daunting economic challenges facing Arab countries in transition following the Arab Awakening and the different trajectories stemming from those nations’ policy responses. Tunisia and Egypt provide an instructive case study: the former made hard fiscal decisions and has embraced sound economic principles and achieved broad support for a reform plan, while the latter, suffering from more difficult political conditions, has been faced with limited policy options that increase the risk for long-term challenges.

Testimony of MEI Resident Scholar Mohamed Elmenshawy before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, delivered February 11, 2014.  Click here for video clips and additional testimony from this hearing.

The Christmas visit of Egypt’s interim president Adly Mansour to the Coptic Cathedral in Cairo occasioned much commentary in the Egyptian press about a new era in church-state relations. Indeed, newspaper headlines heralded the visit as the first undertaken by an Egyptian president to a Coptic patriarch to offer congratulations on a Coptic holiday. The interim president’s magnanimity in making the visit was set in stark contrast to the parsimonious attitude of Hosni Mubarak, who would typically leave such obligatory greetings to a lesser figure in the Egyptian government.

Yemen was not immune to the wave of popular uprisings that swept some countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. However, because of the Yemeni state’s fragility, concurrent zones of conflict, and a power struggle that divided the core military and tribal elites, the international community was afraid that the youth uprising that started in January 2011 might lead to a collapse of the state. Given the consequences of such a collapse on the security of the Gulf states, oil production, and the international war on terror, the Gulf Cooperation Council brokered a deal in November 2011—the Gulf initiative—which laid the foundation for a transitional government. The main aim of the initiative was to secure a peace deal that halted Yemen’s slide into chaos. Peace was sought through the brokering of an inclusive National Dialogue Conference (NDC), but peace did not entail changing the regime or its pattern of politics. While transitional justice has been a part of this process of peaceful reconciliation, it raises questions about the sustainability of this peace and provides a showcase of the precarious state of Yemeni affairs.

John Kerry’s extraordinary efforts to make peace between Israel and Palestine through six months of bilateral talks have produced no significant results. Kerry, determined to succeed, is turning to a “framework” that would create a new basis for continued negotiations. The framework has not yet been released. But if it is a clear outline of an American plan for peace, not just a collection of ideas that avoids laying out U.S. positions, it could be a game changer.

Salma El Sayeh co-authored this article.

This report was co-authored by Ömer Taşpınar and was published by the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution on Jan. 22, 2014. Click here to download the full report as a PDF.

Introduction

Fatemeh Aman co-authored this article.

As President Obama met his top Afghanistan commanders in the Oval Office on February 4 to discuss his decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, he received a compliment from an unlikely source. Ali Akbar Velayati, the top foreign policy aid to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, called Obama’s Afghan withdrawal policy “wise.”