In thinking about how the crisis between Israel and the Hamas leadership in Gaza might play out, it’s useful to reflect upon the preceding Israeli incursion into Gaza in November 2012.
The recent wave of violence between Israel and Hamas, which to date has resulted in the death of more than 100 Palestinians and the injury of several Israelis, continues to escalate with no clear sign of when it might end.
On the north side of Istanbul’s Golden Horn, the Mavi Marmara sits in quiet isolation. In May 2010, the Turkish vessel was carrying aid for the besieged Gaza Strip when Israel forcibly intercepted it in international waters. Nine activists were killed in the raid, and a tenth succumbed to his injuries last month.
The maritime crisis set off several years of polarized relations between Israel and Turkey that both countries believe are now on the mend. These improving ties may produce humanitarian and economic benefits for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
This article first appeared on the Partners for Progressive Israel Blog.
Libya’s road to democracy is shaky at best. Security is deteriorating, with targeted killings, criminal attacks, and bombings on the rise and clashes between rival armed groups—some apparently with government legitimacy and others not—growing more frequent. While these negative trends put tremendous pressure on the transition, Libya’s political process, albeit fickle, manages to keep moving. The efforts at institution building in Libya present a nuanced landscape: for every step forward in one aspect, there are steps backward in others.
U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians have in the last year focused on relations between Israel and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, led by PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Yet there is arguably a far more dynamic and perilous front: one that encompasses Israel, Egypt’s lawless Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip, the latter of which is run by Hamas.
The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.
Libyan popular and political support for engaging the international community offers the United States and Western partners an opportunity to help stabilize a North African energy producer and encourage orderly political change. Conversely, a failure to act could have costly, long-term regional and international security consequences. Domestic political limitations to direct U.S. government engagement, along with other issues that compete for attention and resources, are constraints on a more active policy. Moreover, Libyans themselves would not tolerate a dominating U.S. role.
In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.
This essay is part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) series on “’Civilianizing’ the State in the Middle East and Asia Pacific Regions.” The series explores the past and ongoing processes of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Asia-Pacific countries and examines the steps already taken and still needed in the MENA region. See More
In the wake of the revolutionary fervor that has swept the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, retributive justice has taken precedence over restorative justice approaches as countries seek to address human rights violations.
John Kerry’s extraordinary efforts to make peace between Israel and Palestine through six months of bilateral talks have produced no significant results. Kerry, determined to succeed, is turning to a “framework” that would create a new basis for continued negotiations. The framework has not yet been released. But if it is a clear outline of an American plan for peace, not just a collection of ideas that avoids laying out U.S. positions, it could be a game changer.
In May 2013, Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) overwhelmingly passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL). The PIL’s enactment represented a far-reaching attempt to prevent members of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi from holding public office during the country’s transition. But the decision also appeared to fit a precarious pattern of post-conflict accountability in Libya, which has been characterized by acts of vengeance and one-sided justice aimed at anyone associated with the defeated regime. The passage of the law also reflects the current state of political instability in Libya wherein decisions are politically motivated and often forced at the barrel of the gun rather than agreed upon through public consultation and democratic decision-making.
In the Middle East today, diplomatic success and failure are unfolding side by side, often with some of the same players. High-profile attempts are being made to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, to stop the massacre of innocents in Syria, and to bring Iran in from the cold.
