Research & Commentary Results

It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?

After 20 years of extensive involvement in Afghanistan by the U.S. and other NATO allies, now is the time to ask what China sees in the country and how it plans to approach relations with its new rulers, the Taliban.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Since the Taliban seized control of Kabul on Aug. 15, Russia has expanded its engagement with India and Pakistan on Afghanistan. Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Aug. 24, which resulted in the creation of a permanent bilateral channel for consultations on Afghanistan. On Sept. 8, Modi’s national security advisor, Ajit Doval, met with his Russian counterpart, Nikolay Patrushev, and agreed to expand Russia-India cooperation against terrorism and drug trafficking. On Aug. 25, Putin spoke with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan about the situation in Afghanistan, which resulted in Khan inviting Putin to visit Pakistan. Russia’s simultaneous engagement with India and Pakistan on Afghanistan is the latest iteration of its balancing strategy toward the two South Asian rivals.

The selection of the interim Afghan government led by Mullah Hasan Akhund has the unmistakable stamp of Pakistan’s security establishment. Islamabad has always wanted the international community to believe that the Taliban are a nationalistic Pashtun force that has a legitimate claim to rule the country, but the manner in which the new government has been announced is a testament to the fact that the Taliban are also a proxy force for Pakistan

Ross Harrison, Paul Salem, and Randa Slim join host Alistair Taylor to reflect on 9/11’s impact on US policy in the Middle East over the past 20 years and how its legacy has been viewed by the region.

With Iran, American policymakers have often chased phantoms in search of solu­tions to problems they did not understand. This futile shadow-chase continues when “experts” argue that the U.S. should somehow encourage the break-up of Iran on ethnic or linguistic lines. This idea is simply wrong.

Unanticipated swiftness of victory can be potentially befuddling, even for the victor. After the Taliban’s dramatic and largely bloodless capture of power, their leadership has struggled to finalize the structure of a government that will rule the country. The group, however, has attempted to use the interregnum period to indulge in a rebranding exercise. Statements issued by its spokespersons in Kabul as well as in Doha indicate that the group does not wish to take revenge on the “collaborators” of the fallen government. Instead, it wishes to form an “inclusive” government, which although it will be governed by sharia, may still have role for former government servants and women. However, this could only be a feeble attempt at building a narrative, which the group will find hard to sustain, even in the short term.  

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

On Aug. 25, Iran’s parliament voted on the cabinet of its new president, Ebrahim Raisi, approving 18 out of the 19 ministers put forward. Raisi’s government is full of revolutionaries likely to adopt a hardline approach to domestic and international affairs, leading to heightened geopolitical risk and potentially prolonging the country’s economic crisis.

Under President Ebrahim Raisi, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is poised to exert greater control over Iran’s national security agenda and economy. Several of his ministers and advisors were members of the IRGC or have connections to it.

The evacuation crisis precipitated by the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan following the rapid withdrawal of American troops may further widen the divide between Pakistan and the United States. The Aug. 26 terror attack at Kabul airport claimed by Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), ISIS’s local affiliate, is a clear manifestation of Washington’s epic defeat in the two-decade-long “war on terror” and a sign that President Joe Biden is losing his grip on the Afghan narrative.

We rarely miss an opportunity to criticize our Gulf Arab partners — sometimes rightly so — for not doing enough to safeguard collective interests. But one must acknowledge that on Afghanistan, and especially our just-completed exit from the country, most of our Gulf Arab partners absolutely shined. They deserve a ton of credit for the role they played in our large, challenging, and deadly evacuation — a role which was nothing short of indispensable.

The failure of the Afghan army is a reminder that Pentagon-led security cooperation programs are more expensive and less effective than those led by spies.

من المهم الاعتراف بالجهود الجبارة التي بذلها ضباطنا في الجيش والخدمة الخارجية والمخابرات لإخراج أكثر من 100 ألف من الأمريكيين ومن الأفغان حاملي تأشيرة الهجرة الخاصة من أفغانستان بالتنسيق مع مئات المتطوعين الذين ساعدوهم في كل من الولايات المتحدة وأفغانستان. والأهم من ذلك هو الاعتراف بالجنود من الرجال والنساء الأمريكيين الذين قدموا أقصى التضحيات لبلدهم من أجل حماية الأمريكيين.