Research & Commentary Results

For decades, most refugee crises followed a pattern: A war erupted, usually in a poor country, and beleaguered civilians staggered across the nearest border. The United Nations organized a response, rich nations footed the bill, and aid groups sent in workers to tend to the needy. Even in extreme cases, such as the mass exodus from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the crisis was largely confined to the country at war and a few immediate neighbors.

This contingency planning memorandum was first published by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action. View the PDF version here.

The United Nations has played a critical role in Libya’s modern political history, starting with a stewardship process that led to independence in 1951. It prepared a partial stabilization plan after the 2011 NATO intervention, which unfortunately was not imposed as a precondition for that intervention, and established an essential humanitarian channel to the outside world following the revolution. But for the last months, UN attempts to broker a unity government via its Libya envoy, Bernardino León, have worked against this legacy.

Since March 2011 Syria has gone through a traumatic process that has strained the ethnic, sectarian, and social fabric of the country—almost all that makes Syria a unified state with a people who share a common history, goals, and aspirations—to beyond the breaking point. Much of the country lies in ruins today, and its cultural heritage has been a deliberate casualty of the conflict from its earliest days.

How are Iraq and the United States responding to the capture of Ramadi by ISIS?

April 17, 2015- Ambassador Robert S. Ford discusses the Iraqi PM’s objectives during his visit to Washington, D.C. and the current security situation in Iraq.

This article was first published by NPR.

When Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi weighs the pros and cons of running such a fractured country, here’s the upside: He can count on five separate military groups supporting his battle against the self-declared Islamic State.

The downside is that he has limited control of these groups, and of much of his country.

Al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi—also known as the Popular Mobilization Units, the Shi‘i militias, or simply “the Hashd”—has joined Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish peshmerga to spearhead Iraq’s ongoing offensive against ISIS. The coordinated assault has scored significant successes in various parts of Diyala, Babil, and Salah al-Din, including the recapture of Tikrit. With this string of recent triumphs, the Hashd has provided a potent rallying point for a reinvigorated sense of Iraqi nationalism, albeit one with distinctly Shi‘i overtones.

This article draws on a recent special report prepared for Dentons, an international law firm.

Robert Baer’s See No Evil presents a firsthand account of the life of a CIA case officer in the war on terror. From recruiting agents in the volatile Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to wiretapping Abu Nidal students in France, Baer provides a fascinating description of his CIA service.

It has long been known that the Assad regime, facing a shortage of manpower in its regular army, has had to rely on irregular paramilitaries in its bid to reverse rebel advances. This became particularly apparent in 2013, when Hezbollah openly declared its participation in the capture of Qusayr, a town in Homs Province on the border with Lebanon.

Read the full article on LobeLog.

“Crises left to fester sometimes find their own way to the front burner.” Written on January 5, 2015, this sentence reflected my fear that starving Libya of high-profile international attention was increasingly risky. The beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya by Islamic State (ISIS) extremists this week appears to have placed the situation in Libya front and center.

On January 28, 2015, jihadis in Sinai launched multiple, simultaneous attacks against Egyptian security forces in the vicinity of El Arish and the nearby towns of Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah. These attacks occurred only hours after President Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi said that he would die defending the region from terror. “We will never leave Sinai,” Sisi said. “Sinai is ours.

When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) overran Mosul last June, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the preeminent Shi‘i cleric in Iraq, called for voluntary jihad. The outlook for the central government was bleak. Reports from the battlefronts, as well as threatening statements by ISIS leaders, suggested that the capital Baghdad could also fall to ISIS. The group repeatedly massacred its captives and systematically destroyed important religious and cultural sites.