Research & Commentary Results

Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.

In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?

The latest figures from the Pentagon indicate that the total number of COVID-19 cases among members of the U.S. military has topped 60,000 since the onset of the pandemic. COVID-19 and other similar outbreaks could become an increasingly important consideration in the calculus of future military deployments. They could add impetus to the Pentagon’s development of lethal autonomous weapons or at least be cited as a perfect reason to do so. This could, in turn, have significant implications for the future of both U.S. military operations in the Middle East and the U.S. military presence in the region.

The U.S. and LAF have a mutual interest in maintaining U.S. security assistance.

A March 2018 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research showed that satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmoud Abbas stood at 33 percent; 68 percent of the public wanted him to resign; and had elections been called, he would most likely have lost his presidency to a rival from Hamas.Nearly two and a half years later, however, and Abbas’s political fortunes have been restored, thanks in large part to the Trump administration and the United Arab Emirates

Nine years of conflict in Syria has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on regional and international security. Although overarching dynamics have changed, the crisis is far from over — it is merely evolving. All of the conflict’s root causes remain in place and many have worsened. In controlling less than two-thirds of the country, the Syrian state and its Russian and Iranian backers are increasingly incapable of addressing the many challenges they face: economic collapse and inflation, fledgling insurgencies, a resurgent ISIS, a COVID crisis, and endemic corruption and mismanagement. What happens in Syria never stays in Syria. The United States cannot afford to prematurely withdraw or sustain today’s inconsistent and ill-considered policy — it must step up, re-assert its leverage, strengthen its partners, mobilize its allies, and move determinedly toward protecting American interests and helping to diplomatically resolve the crisis once and for all, creating space for foreign actors, the U.S. included, to depart Syrian soil responsibly.

In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward. 

On Feb. 16, 2015, then British Ambassador to Yemen Jane Marriott wrote an article titled “Yemen: the ball is in the Houthis’ court,” asserting that the future of the country and its stability were dependent on the Houthis.

On Aug. 14, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. International reactions to this historic deal were sharply polarized, but the two main strategic rivals of the United States, Russia and China, responded cautiously to the announcement.

Moscow has been scaling down its activities in eastern Syria and the most likely reason for this inertia lies in Moscow’s reluctance to be associated with actors seeking to erode the quasi-autonomy of the Trans-Euphrates region. Instead, Russia prefers to stand to the side and watch events unfold, while contemplating the right moment to jump in as a mediator and reap the political rewards.

Soldiers refuse to stand with protesters amid growing criticism from Hezbollah.

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.

The leaders of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have traditionally been known as masters at staying as neutral as possible, especially when it comes to inter-Arab relations. This was on clear display in Amman’s response to the recent UAE-Israel rapprochement.

The agreement signed yesterday by Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in which the two countries agreed to a “full normalization of relations” in return for Israel suspending moves to formally annex parts of the West Bank, has reminded the Palestinians that they cannot count on the Arab states to deliver their freedom or safeguard their rights.

No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates­—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.