Research & Commentary Results

منذ بداية الانتفاضة السورية مايو 2011 وحتى صيف العام 2015، فشلت الميليشيات الإيرانية إلى جانب الجيش السوري والميليشيات المحلية في إعادة السيطرة على البلاد، على الرغم من العدد الهائل لمجموع هذه القوات أمام المتمردين الذين كانت حركتهم فوضوية في مقابل أجهزة أمنية وقوات منظمة، حيث سيطرت هذه القوات المتمردة على النظام السوري مساحات واسعة من سوريا.

The Russian military intervention in Syria in late 2015 brought about a clear change in the balance of power in the military, political, and psychological spheres. The Russian military, especially its air force, dramatically tipped the scales in the conflict between the armed opposition, the regime, and the Iranian militias. Moscow’s intervention was also accompanied by a project to regain control over the security and military situation in Syria, but this effort proved far less successful.

Although it is home to the Horn of Africa’s main transshipment hub, a host of foreign military bases, and a booming local service sector, Djibouti faces a number of major economic challenges, including new and growing competition, dangerous reliance on Ethiopian power and water supplies, climate change, and high levels of debt. This is why Djibouti needs a Plan B for what comes next after the presidency of its long-time leader, Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999.

STMicroelectronics, one of Europe’s leading semiconductor manufacturers, will very shortly inaugurate a new production line in Morocco to manufacture electronic chips for American electric car pioneer Tesla. The production line is the latest example of a larger trend among international firms to look to Morocco as an attractive location for “nearshoring.” Through Rabat’s smart infrastructure investments and careful management of its foreign partnerships, Morocco has already exploited this trend to emerge as Africa’s leading automaker. Now with an auto chip production line dedicated to electric vehicles (EVs), Morocco is positioning itself to become a center for EV production while turning itself into a strategic component of Western semiconductor supply chain resilience.

Lebanon is steadily plunging into total darkness. Decades of political bickering, weak governance, and vested interests have taken their toll on the power sector and are developing into economic and humanitarian crises. A long-term strategy focused on improving the sector’s governance is needed. In the short term, however, immediate actions such as distributed renewable energy and out-of-the-box financing mechanisms should be taken to avoid the darkest hour.

The decision to withdraw the relatively small number of U.S. troops from a supporting role to our Afghan partners to preserve our hard-fought-for gains in Afghanistan was a mistake.

In spite of the growing political distance between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, it was economic factors that played the key role in the UAE decision not to support the extension of the OPEC+ agreement until the end of 2022, thus putting on hold the cartel’s decision to increase production in the coming months. The OPEC+ agreement in place since December 2016 may have finally run its course. The medium term will see a changed landscape among oil producers, not just in the GCC, but globally as they compete for customers in emerging markets, the only place where oil demand is expected to increase after 2030, and as they attempt to transform their businesses across energy products. The national oil companies that can access capital, attract new investment, offload assets, and be nimble enough to grow across energy lines, whether it be hydrogen, solar, or even natural gas, will be the ones that thrive. Producers like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and even Russia and Saudi Arabia may be at a disadvantage in accessing new investment and pursuing transformation. The future of OPEC and its ancillary partners is one of intense competition and divergent time horizons for hydrocarbon exploitation.

The Biden administration’s goals in climate policy, renewable energy infrastructure investment both domestically and globally (the Build Back Better World, or B3W, initiative), and its Middle East policy may be on the verge of a collision. While the administration would like to dial back its engagement in the Middle East at least militarily, the region will be essential to meeting U.S. foreign and domestic energy goals.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said arrived in Neom, Saudi Arabia, on July 11, 2021, in his first foreign trip since becoming the sultan of Oman on Jan. 11, 2020. At the start of his two-day visit to the kingdom he was met by King Salman and accompanied by a high-level Omani delegation. A slew of new agreements were signed across commerce, culture, and transport.

Even the most ardent supporters of President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan recognize the inherent tension in his policy. Biden promised Afghanistan’s top leaders in a recent meeting at the White House that he would maintain U.S. material support to the country. But ensuring a “sustained” partnership with a politically fragile Afghan government requires first and foremost an Afghan force that’s capable of defending that government, providing some security across the country, containing the Taliban, and preventing terrorists from once again setting up shop and plotting attacks worldwide like they did on 9/11. 

In the past few months, several articles have been written on the significant rise in the Saudi female labor force participation rate (LFPR) from 17.7% in Q2, 2016 to 33.2% in Q4, 2020. Interestingly, this increase in female LFPR was not coupled with a rise in unemployment, which often occurs when workforce participation rises for a particular group. In fact, the unemployment rate among female nationals declined to its lowest level in four years, at 24.4% in Q4, 2020. However, it still remains over twice as high as that for male nationals. Another positive labor market indicator, albeit one receiving little attention from analysts, is the significant change in the employment rate among Saudi women. In other words, Saudi women not only increased their share in the workforce, but were also able to gain jobs once they entered the labor force.

On July 1, 2021, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, accompanied by Mohamed Alabbar, an entrepreneur and the chairman of UAE real estate firm Eagle Hills, attended a ceremony in Belgrade. It commemoratedthe final work on a tower within Waterfront Belgrade, a major real estate project funded by the UAE. The ceremony was an illustration of the growing ties between Serbia and the UAE, which over the past nine years has become Belgrade’s primary partner in the Arab world. The UAE has also emerged as a source of cash and an instrument of domestic political promotion for the Serbian leadership.

Oil and gas have long dominated trade and investment flows between Singapore and the Gulf. In the wake of two new projects — one in Singapore and the other in the United Arab Emirates — unveiled last month, this article considers whether Singapore and the Gulf are on the cusp of a new level and type of economic relations.

The factor of Iranian oil, while important for the situation in the oil market, turned out to be somewhat overestimated in terms of its impact on OPEC+ decision-making.

The forces and agencies of Kurdistan’s Ministry of Interior and the Kurdistan Region Security Council, collectively referred to the Kurdistan Region Interior Forces, are now the region’s main security actors, but their role as instruments of partisan rivalry and enforcers of public loyalty to the political bureaus threatens the Kurdistan Region’s stability. This report makes the case that coalition security sector reform efforts should be refocused on them. Although Peshmerga reform is necessary to improve the Kurdistan Region’s ability to combat external threats, it is equally, if not more important to start the same reform within these internal forces and agencies to achieve durable stability.