Research & Commentary Results

Iran offers a unique platform for China’s ambitions in the Middle East, and as such Beijing is willing to bet that the benefits of closer ties with Tehran will outnumber the costs. This analysis examines the calculations China is making regarding its relationship with Iran and argues that deepening bilateral ties reveal the centrality of Iran for China’s Middle East strategy.

Whatever eventually comes of the security agreements and mutual pledges of support made at last week’s summit conference between President Obama and leaders of the Arab Gulf monarchies, one result is clear: Saudi Arabia and the others may not be enthusiastic about the pending nuclear agreement with Iran, but they will not actively oppose it.

Yemen, like many other states in the region, has never conformed to the norms of an integral nation state; it has been in a state of crisis since at least the 1990s due to constant competition between the ruling state authority and various clans, tribal groups, transnational movements, and secessionists. In addition to these layers of conflict, regional players have tried to exploit domestic instability to further their own interests.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2013 proclamation of the Silk Road Economic Belt (“One Belt, One Road”) and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives provided an overarching framework for understanding China’s strategic priorities over the coming decade. The land-based and sea-based Silk Roads will link Asia and Europe via the Middle East and Central Asia through a series of transcontinental railroads, pipelines, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects.

The term “strategic partnership” has been increasingly used in GCC circles to signify that relations with China are important and worthy of long-term investment. In a March 14, 2014 speech during his visit to Beijing, Saudi Arabia’s then Crown Prince Salman announced that “we are witnessing the transformation of the relationship with China to one of strategic partnership with broad dimensions, to the benefit of both our countries.” Saudi Arabia’s position was echoed by the emir of Qatar during a 2014 visit to China in which issues of common concern to all GCC states, especially combating terrorism, were discussed. Abdel-Aziz Aluwaisheg, GCC general assistant secretary for negotiations and strategic dialogue, has also noted that there is growing interest in the Gulf to develop a “strategic dialogue” with China.

Over the course of the past ten years, NATO[1] has consistently invited Saudi Arabia and Oman to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which launched in 2004 as a cooperation framework between NATO and the GCC countries. So far, the ICI contains just four Gulf partners (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates), and neither Riyadh nor Muscat has accepted the invitation.

While there have been studies on the development of Islamic philanthropic organizations in fostering social welfare in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, the role of international Islamic aid agencies, including those from Gulf countries, in their dealings with Southeast Asian domestic welfare issues remains unexplored. This essay discusses the growth of Gulf charitable organizations operating in Southeast Asia, particularly the reasons for this phenomenon and the types of activities in which these organizations are engaged, and then takes an in-depth look at two Gulf charities that are active in Indonesia, namely the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Asian Muslim Charity Foundation (AMCF) and Qatar Charity.

This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.

Thanks to unprecedented current account surpluses, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are investing billions abroad and looking more toward the East. The GCC’s growing trade ties with China have been accompanied by encouraging development in investment relations. For these countries, investment projects in China promise access not only to large and rapidly growing energy markets, but also to other booming sectors.

This essay explores recent GCC investment in sectors of the Chinese economy other than the petrochemicals industry and examines the challenges confronted by Gulf investors.

The rise of China and India, coupled with major changes in the global energy market such as the US shale revolution have shifted the Gulf countries’ economic focus towards the Asian continent. East Asia has already emerged as the GCC’s most important trade partner, accounting for over 57% of its external trade.

One way to grasp the immense difficulty facing President Obama as he tries to forge an effective international coalition to oppose the Islamic State is to examine the difference between this effort and the last time the United States led a diverse group of countries to take on a conflict in the Middle East: Operation Desert Storm, in 1991.

Over the past four decades, economic relations between the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been focused on two sectors. Given the lack of energy resources in Korea, the GCC countries have provided oil and gas for Korean manufacturing, electricity, transport, and related activities. These countries have also provided Korea with business opportunities in the construction sector, including the building of expressways, seaports, and industrial plants.

Geography alone should make the Arab world Iran’s key foreign policy focus. Of Iran’s 13 immediate neighbors, seven are Arab countries.[1] But Tehran’s approach to the Arab world, with its 22 states extending from North Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, varies widely in intensity, and Iran’s objectives are equally varied depending on the country in question.