Research & Commentary Results

On Sept. 14, the news that Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities had been attacked and damaged came as a shock. And yet, in the not too distant future, this attack will likely be regarded as a tactical mistake. Tehran has miscalculated the timing of such a spectacular attack and it’s unclear whether Iran will get another opportunity to strike such a surprise blow again.

After five years of indecisive war, there is a clear desire on the part of the international community to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end, and the recent UN-endorsed Houthi initiative seems predicated on the assumption that ending the fighting between Riyadh and the Houthis would achieve this. A closer look at the situation, however, suggests this assumption is flawed.

The Saudis made their first cautious moves to disentangle themselves from Yemen but remain far from any settlement. In response to an earlier announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by the Houthis on the fifth anniversary of their entrance into Sanaa, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman said that a settlement in Yemen would be far easier if the Houthis abandoned their Iranian backers. His comments come after the Saudis announced a partial ceasefire covering some areas in Yemen, but Saudi planes attacked Houthi positions in northern Yemen along the border as if to emphasize that it is only a partial ceasefire.

In its final report, the congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) provided a bleak but wholly realistic assessment of the state of the crisis in Syria. When it comes to policy prescriptions, however, the SSG falls short. Despite clearly identifying the “means and ends” gap as one of two core problems with U.S. policy in Syria, the “recommendations” suggested by the SSG differ little, if at all, from those already in place.

In the end, it all fell apart rather quickly. Instead of a long-awaited announcement about the details of a U.S.-Afghan Taliban peace deal, on Sept. 7 President Donald Trump tweeted that the talks were off, adding shortly afterwards that the Afghan peace process was “dead.” Only days earlier, Washington’s special representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, had announced a draft agreement had been reached after nine rounds of gruelling negotiations.

Riyadh has military options for retaliating against Iran. The Trump administration needs to persuade Saudi leaders not to use them.

The Sept. 14 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing plant has put Pakistan in a place it never wanted to be: possibly forced to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The Trump administration is reportedly considering launching another cyber attack against Iran to deter it from further aggression in the region.

Without better infrastructure for using U.S.-made weapons systems, the Arab countries will keep coming up short.

At a trilateral summit in Ankara earlier this week, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sat back and ate treats as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told the world that efforts to topple the Assad regime have failed. The scene was a stark reminder of how far Turkey’s Syria policy has shifted.

Saudi Arabia is under direct assault, and America’s response is muted. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s verbal threats against Iran, which is behind the attack, he’s not seriously contemplating using force. What’s most urgent now for U.S. policymakers is how to prevent this from happening again and how to most effectively defend U.S. partners from aggression in this still vital part of the world.

One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.

Three years after a major Islamic State (IS)-claimed attack in its capital Dhaka, defeating the group remains a work in progress for Bangladesh. The residual and regenerative capacity of the local pro-IS cells in Bangladesh is significant as evidenced by actual and thwarted attacks in the country during the first half of 2019. Amidst the threat emanating from Bangladeshi jihadist returnees from Syria, IS ideology continues to resonate and attracts new recruits in this part of South Asia. It remains to be seen how Bangladesh will respond to the re-surfacing of the IS, especially at a time when the region is witnessing inter-religious tensions.

Over the past few weeks, my colleagues at MEI have debated whether the U.S. should stay in Syria or leave. Here I’d make a different argument: that it doesn’t really matter. The president has already made the decision to leave, and while his aides may have been able to slow roll the troop drawdown, the reality is that Donald Trump has made it clear the U.S. will not disburse any additional resources. Even within the 2020 Democratic field, not a single candidate has advocated increasing resources.

Turkey and the US recently announced an agreement for establishing a safe zone in northern Syria to serve as a buffer between Turkey and the YPG, which is seen by Ankara as a terrorist group and by Washington as a partner in the fight against ISIS. MEI’s Gonul Tol and Charles Lister join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how this policy may impact dynamics on the ground.