Iraq in 2019: Protests, politics, and a struggle for power
The protestors are demanding a radical change of the ethno-sectarian power-sharing system put in place after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The protestors are demanding a radical change of the ethno-sectarian power-sharing system put in place after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The main — perhaps only — issue in Israeli politics now is the future of Netanyahu.
Given their territorial proximity, the regional actors of the Middle East have always had an interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a window to Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to Georgia’s isolation, and in the years since the country has gradually started reclaiming its historical role as a cultural and economic crossroads between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Two months into the popular uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon, both countries are mired in a painful standoff.
Attempts by the indicted Israeli leader to railroad through a joint U.S.-Israel defense treaty in opposition to the Palestinians and other Arabs will be disastrous for America’s national interest.
Political analyst Hafsa Halawa and MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the political crisis in Iraq following the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, the protest movements that have rocked both Iraq and Iran, and the impact of Iranian impact in Baghdad on Iraq’s development going forward.
There is no end in sight to Iraq’s political crisis even though Parliament unanimously voted to remove Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi on Sunday. Abdul-Mahdi now tends a caretaker government while Iraq’s political leaders are interpreting the country’s constitution to give President Barham Salih 15 days starting from Nov. 30 to name a new prime minister.
Tehran’s reaction to the resignation of Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi is one of accepting the seemingly inevitable.
Although 350 Iraqis have died to date and close to 16,000 have been wounded, protesters are not going home. Yet, most of the ruling clique is still rejecting the idea of forcing the prime minister to resign.
It is clear that the Israeli political system has reached a peak in terms of the challenges it faces: two elections campaigns to date this year have not led to conclusive results and a third round may be right around the corner.
Since early October, the southern provinces of Iraq have been consumed by protests and strikes. While ruthlessly attempting to suppress protests, the Iraqi government has promised legal and political reforms. Yet some of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq’s elites are suspicious that the government’s reform agenda is a “conspiracy” against Kurdish entitlements masquerading as a good faith effort to placate the protestors. The region’s hegemonic parties are concerned that legal, constitutional, and procedural reforms may overhaul the institutions that guarantee their positions of influence in the federal government and secure their territorial claims.
It is not always recognized that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Nov. 18 declaration that Israeli “settlements are not inconsistent with international law” was primarily political, not diplomatic, designed for domestic American consumption as part of the president’s reelection campaign. Secondarily, it was intended to strengthen Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hand in the current coalition negotiations and/or the likely upcoming Knesset election, if coalition negotiations fail. Third on the list, almost an afterthought, is the effect on the Palestinians, whose future state’s boundaries it purports to impact.
A Nov. 12 Israeli airstrike on the Gaza Strip killed Baha Abu al-Ata, a commander with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militant group. Over the ensuring 48 hours, the PIJ launched some 450 rockets from Gaza into southern and central Israel. Hamas, the Palestinian political party/militant group that acts as the de facto government of Gaza, stayed out of the fighting — despite relatively high civilian casualties and the killing of one of its fighters.
The role of cybersecurity in the future of geopolitics in the Middle East and the surrounding regions will have much to do with individual state and enterprise preparedness. With cyber threats a growing source of interstate tension, governments must take measures to increase national cyber preparedness that are tailored to their vulnerabilities and cyber ecosystems. Israel and Estonia are examples of states that prove this rule. Despite their relatively small size, both have demonstrated an exceptional capacity to deter or defend against cyber aggression from their much larger, more aggressive neighbors.