Research & Commentary Results

The role of cybersecurity in the future of geopolitics in the Middle East and the surrounding regions will have much to do with individual state and enterprise preparedness. With cyber threats a growing source of interstate tension, governments must take measures to increase national cyber preparedness that are tailored to their vulnerabilities and cyber ecosystems. Israel and Estonia are examples of states that prove this rule. Despite their relatively small size, both have demonstrated an exceptional capacity to deter or defend against cyber aggression from their much larger, more aggressive neighbors.

Emerson T. Brooking of the Digital Forensics Research Lab at the Atlantic Council and Steph Shample of Flashpoint join guest host Mike Sexton, director of MEI’s Cyber Program, to discuss several recent investigations into Iranian and Russian hacking and disinformation campaigns that have targeted US politics and other international organizations.

The U.S. and World Bank sponsored talks last week between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – the latest developments in a regional soap opera that’s been running since 2010, when Ethiopia first announced the construction of the dam.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, ties between Western and Eastern Europe were renewed. In the same period, another wall crumbled — between the Middle East and the former Soviet states. And yet, to this day, U.S. national security institutions continue to view these two regions through a Cold War lens, separating how they are handled. This approach needs to change; integrating research and policy toward the Middle East and the bordering states of the former Soviet Union would improve analytical understanding and help identify new policy options.

Taking the American diplomats hostage for 444 days consolidated the Iranian revolution around the Khomeinists, but very few people in Tehran today will deny that it came at the great expense of isolating Iran internationally for the past 40 years.

Once he’s gone, it will have to find a new purpose.

It has now been almost 18 months since Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued 12 demands to Iran and imposed a “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Tehran to change behavior.

The increasing involvement of Iran in disinformation and attempted email hacking, in tandem with the revelation of Turla hijacking Iranian hacking infrastructure, risks muddying the waters even further with regard to attributing and countering election interference in 2020.

While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.

In a move that surprised no one, on Oct. 19 the Afghan election commission said it was unable to announce the preliminary results of the Sept. 28 presidential election as planned, due to delays in processing biometric data. Held amid political uncertainty, terrorist violence, and general skepticism, the September election was the fourth presidential contest in Afghanistan since 2001, when the brutal Taliban regime was toppled in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the United States.

Deep political, familial, and religious ties have allowed Druze communities across the Levant to remain largely unified against external threats, but eight years of violence in Syria and a coordinated campaign by the regime and its allies now threaten to destabilize regional Druze politics and erode the sect’s political and military power. An Iranian-backed campaign by Hezbollah to incite inter-Druze violence in Lebanon has curtailed this unity, laying the groundwork for Hezbollah to expand into Syria’s Suwayda province with impunity.

With an estimated $1 trillion in natural resources and sitting astride an international crossroads of increasingly critical importance, Balochistan is becoming a stage on which the world’s powers are playing out their ambitions. China, the U.S., and India have all formulated Balochistan policies in the past few years, hoping to utilize the region to achieve wider international goals — and the three countries across which Balochistan is divided, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, have been eager to use it as a bargaining chip for their own purposes.

While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.

Washington has a hard long-term choice when it comes to Syria. The best chance for an optimal solution through a negotiated political deal was lost years ago. The U.S. now must choose a policy which will yield only a “least-bad” result.

On Sept. 16, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war. In all three countries, the Ankara summit was hailed as a major success, as negotiations on the formation of a Syrian constitutional committee concluded and progress was made toward resolving other outstanding challenges, such as the future of northeastern Syria and the ongoing struggle for Idlib.