Summary
The military took advantage of political crisis to remove civilian governments in Egypt in 2013 and Thailand in 2014. This essay discusses three important features of the Egyptian and Thai political systems that have fostered the military’s ruling ambition in both cases.
February 2016 marks the beginning of a new phase in the Chinese lunar calendar, drawing to a close a year marked by heightened risks and fortuitous gains in China’s efforts to secure its interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This essay addresses three questions: How well has China adapted to the conflict and instability that have swept the region? And as we enter the Year of the Red Fire Monkey, what are the concerns that are likely to preoccupy Chinese leaders? What, if any, policy adjustments by Beijing, can realistically be expected in light of the current circumstances and uncertain prospects for the region and for China itself?
Amb. Robert Ford delivered the following prepared remarks at a hearing of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on January 12, 2016. Click here to watch C-SPAN’s coverage of the hearing.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
It is an honor to be on this distinguished panel. Thank you for inviting me.
This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”
Abstract
Introduction
Prior to the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s surprisingly independent and assertive judiciary had gained recognition among scholars, political opposition figures, and many in the NGO community for strength and activism in defense of democratic values and political rights.[1] As Nathan Brown wrote in 2008:
This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”
This essay discusses the various barriers that inhibit local communities in densely populated, poor quarters in Cairo from taking action in order to improve the provision of basic services and the overall conditions in these neighborhoods.
Roughly five decades since the Soviet foray into the Middle East vis-à-vis the Czech arms deal with Egypt in September 1955, Russia is reasserting its influence in Egypt. The deal marked the beginning of a brief period that saw Moscow serve as the primary military supplier for a number of regional countries that formed an ‘anti-imperialist front’, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.
Despite its preferences, the United States is quietly increasing and modifying its military deployment in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in response to the growing threat posed by ISIS.
This article was first published in The Hoover Institution’s The Caravan.
Daesh or ISIS does not represent an existential threat to any state except Syria and Iraq. It occupies and controls ungoverned space in the region between Iraq and Syria and in parts of northern Africa; and its self-proclaimed Caliphate has benefited from the seizure of some income producing assets in these areas. Daesh depends on the dynamism of success and expansion, both of which have been in short supply of late.
On the rooftop of a three-story brick building tucked inside a dusty alley of ‘Izbat al-Nasr, a poor and informal neighborhood southeast of Cairo, Leila Hussein crouches, tending to the basil and rocket she grows. The incessant cackling of geese, chickens, and pigeons emanating from the roof of a similarly run-down, red brick structure opposite the street gives an eerie, rural soundtrack to her meticulous work.
The Egyptian state today faces one acute crisis after the other. To be fair, the Egyptian military cannot be held responsible for creating these crises. However, it is unlikely that Egypt will be able to resolve them unless and until the armed forces divests itself of the power and the privileges associated with the immense economic power and privileges it has accumulated.
According to the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects 2014, there are 28 “megacities” worldwide (i.e., urban agglomerations with populations in excess of 10 million). By 2030 another dozen will likely be added to their ranks.