Research & Commentary Results

The ironies of modern Turkey’s history seem to be emerging in sharper relief. On Sunday, August 30, Turkey will celebrate its signal victory of 1922, which capped the struggle of Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founding father, to secure the country’s freedom. From the beginning of that war of liberation until final victory, Ataturk worked tirelessly to gain the support of all Turks for the fight for independence. That victory of 1922 was a military triumph, but it also reflected the power of a united people to bring a dream to reality.

Read the full piece at The National Interest.

After months of hesitation to take action against the Islamic State (ISIS) and almost two years of quiet since a 2013 truce with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey decided to pick a fight with both. It has been pounding Islamic State targets in Syria and PKK positions in northern Iraq.

Salafi discourse has made considerable inroads in Turkey over the past 30 years, making contributions to sectarianism in ways that have yet to be fully studied and understood.

For decades, most refugee crises followed a pattern: A war erupted, usually in a poor country, and beleaguered civilians staggered across the nearest border. The United Nations organized a response, rich nations footed the bill, and aid groups sent in workers to tend to the needy. Even in extreme cases, such as the mass exodus from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the crisis was largely confined to the country at war and a few immediate neighbors.

Read the full article on LobeLog.

Three months after Saudi Arabia rounded up a few allies and began an intensive bombing campaign against the rebels known as Houthis across the border in Yemen, a conventional wisdom has developed. “It has not worked,” as The New York Times put it in a front-page article, and it probably can’t work because the strategic goals are too murky, the factions are too entrenched, the rivalries are too intense, and the conflict is too complicated to be resolved by a simplistic solution.

Oman’s government has declined to participate in the current Saudi-led military effort in Yemen. Instead, the country’s ruler, Sultan Qaboos, has called for “non-interference.” This position is an argument for internal political compromise that will eliminate the perceived need for Arab military intervention. To that end, Oman is offering a venue for talks with the hope of moving the political discussion forward.

After initially rejecting the UN call for talks, the Saudi-backed Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi faction reversed its position and agreed to meetings in Geneva on June 14.

June 8, 2015 – Gonul Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute, discusses the reactions to Turkey’s June 7 elections, and what the setback for the ruling AK party and President Erdogan means for Turkey’s domestic policy agenda and its relations with the United States.

On June 7, Turks will choose a new parliament. This decision will be the most important one for Turkey in 70 years, since the advent of multi-party elections in 1945. The election at heart is about religion, as it brings Turkey to the brink of becoming a republic dominated by the religious convictions of its current leadership. If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins a 60 percent majority of parliamentary seats, democratic choice will likely yield to the dogma of faith.

Turkish citizens are going to the polls on June 7 to elect the next government that will rule the country until 2019. With an ongoing peace process with the Kurds, a stumbling democracy, an economic recession on the horizon, the prospect of constitutional reform, a stalled EU accession process, tension in Turkey-U.S. relations, and a region engulfed in chaos, the stakes have not been higher.

With an ongoing peace process with the Kurds and a stumbling democracy, the stakes for Turkey’s parliamentary elections next month have not been higher. The opposition parties—the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—need all the help they can get to deny an outright victory to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has ruled Turkey since 2002. The growing popularity of the pro-Kurdish HDP, along with signs of declining support for the AKP, point to the possibility of a significant shift in Turkish politics.

Yemen, like many other states in the region, has never conformed to the norms of an integral nation state; it has been in a state of crisis since at least the 1990s due to constant competition between the ruling state authority and various clans, tribal groups, transnational movements, and secessionists. In addition to these layers of conflict, regional players have tried to exploit domestic instability to further their own interests.

In this MEI Policy Paper, Ross Harrison asserts that a new regional order is emerging out of the conflicts of the Middle East. The relationships among the pillars of this order–Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran–are crucial, as they will largely determine “whether the future of the Middle East will be a continuation of the current chaos and destruction or a more positive transition toward stability and prosperity.” Harrison argues that global powers must concentrate on creating conditions conducive to cooperation among the pillars.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen is not surprising given Riyadh’s past policies and current perspectives on Gulf security. Yemen has always suffered from varying degrees of chaos and civil strife. Even in the best of times, large areas of the country lacked government control, and few if any in the region saw it as a functioning nation state. Whatever Gulf Arab leaders may have said publicly, most have viewed Yemen as a loose collection of autonomous or even independent regions, held together only by the lines drawn on a map.