Research & Commentary Results

No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates­—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.

When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.

Beirut will rise again from the ashes, like it always has. But the real rebuilding that must occur is not physical in nature. It is political. Nothing will truly change in Lebanon unless the country’s corrupt and incompetent leaders, who have been in power for decades, are unseated.

After months of under-reported cases and relaxed lockdown measures, the rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic has gripped government-held areas. A worrying rise in daily deaths and infections, especially in Damascus, has left Syria facing what could be its biggest challenge yet.

Tunisia seems to have avoided the worst of the first phase of the global coronavirus crisis. And yet whatever the final tally of the pandemic might be, its consequences will only add to a host of existing problems that have beset the North African country in recent years, including political instability, a stalled economy, security threats, and financial woes.

The Israelis and Hezbollah are at it again. Earlier this week, they seem to have skirmished in the Shebaa Farms area. In their latest exchange of fire, or fiery statements, Israel and Hezbollah are continuing a new tradition of contained conflicts — one stretching back five years, when the Israelis stepped up efforts to interdict weapons shipments, destroy infrastructure, and kill Iranian or Iranian-supported officials and fighters in Syria (and indeed Iraq).

I don’t understand why Iran’s Revolutionary Guards insist on conducting military exercises in the Gulf waters that are as devoid of credibility as they are comical. Because if the goal of these drills is to intimidate or change the calculations of the U.S. Navy, nobody is flinching or losing any sleep in the Bahrain-headquartered U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, or NAVCENT.

If elected, Joe Biden and his administration will face a wide range of foreign policy challenges. Possibly none will be more vexing than what to do about the clerical regime in Iran.

With allies and direct lines to Beijing, Washington must do more to keep China’s presence in the region from becoming a threat.

The coronavirus pandemic that originated in China could not have come at a worse moment for the UAE. Indeed, before its outbreak, relations between the UAE and China were in an excellent place. Underpinned by growing economic exchange, the bilateral partnership holds the promise of turning into a geo-economic and geopolitical one. For Beijing, the UAE is first and foremost a critical hub for re-export to the wider region and ultimately, it is in the domain of maritime trade and around China’s BRI that the partnership has its greatest potential.

Oman’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham, only has a short timeframe in which to aggressively diversify the country’s economy and reduce its dependency on hydrocarbon exports. This already difficult task is further complicated by the twin challenges of the global coronavirus pandemic and low oil prices, both of which limit the government’s fiscal room for maneuver. One obvious sector that Oman should consider expanding rapidly is its tourism industry.

So far, Saudi Arabia’s push for OPEC+ restraint appears to be working. If projections of a gradual demand recovery in 2020 are accurate, the Saudis should be able to reaffirm their centrality as market stabilizers.

The nationwide protests that erupted in October 2019 shifted the political landscape and paradigm of Iraqi political participation: Led by motivated Iraqi youth in their teens and twenties with no previous civic experience, they signal a rejection of the post-2003 sectarian patronage system, known as muhassasa, that has failed to deliver security, economic development, or basic services. The protest movement’s spontaneity and authenticity are its core strength; no public figure or party directed the waves of protests across central and southern Iraq.

Over the past decade, the two main pillars of Lebanon’s stability have been the country’s army and its banking sector. Today one of those pillars — the banking sector — has all but fallen and Lebanon is standing on one leg: its army.

Lebanon is on the brink of collapse due to its domestic economic and political crises, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Another failed state in the Middle East would negatively impact strategic U.S. interests in the region. Lebanon requires a thorough reorientation towards stability and renewed socio-economic sustainability which entails fundamental domestic reforms and targeted international support led by the U.S.