Research & Commentary Results

Amb. Philip Wilcox, MEI scholar and president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, discusses the motivations that led to the current escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and why Israel decided to pursue a ground assault in Gaza.

Israel’s ground assault continues an historical pattern of dealing with threats from adversaries. How well has this strategy worked before?

In thinking about how the crisis between Israel and the Hamas leadership in Gaza might play out, it’s useful to reflect upon the preceding Israeli incursion into Gaza in November 2012.

The recent wave of violence between Israel and Hamas, which to date has resulted in the death of more than 100 Palestinians and the injury of several Israelis, continues to escalate with no clear sign of when it might end.

On the north side of Istanbul’s Golden Horn, the Mavi Marmara sits in quiet isolation. In May 2010, the Turkish vessel was carrying aid for the besieged Gaza Strip when Israel forcibly intercepted it in international waters. Nine activists were killed in the raid, and a tenth succumbed to his injuries last month.

The maritime crisis set off several years of polarized relations between Israel and Turkey that both countries believe are now on the mend. These improving ties may produce humanitarian and economic benefits for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Understanding the new president of Israel, Reuven (“Ruby”) Rivlin—his motives and beliefs, how he contrasts with outgoing President Shimon Peres, and what role he is likely to play during his seven-year term—requires some knowledge of history and Zionist ideology.

This article first appeared on the Partners for Progressive Israel Blog.

Israel’s recent natural gas discoveries have the potential to transform the country into a major supplier of natural gas to the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Israel’s Leviathan field alone is believed to contain tens of billions of dollars worth of natural gas, and is the world’s largest offshore natural gas discovery of the last decade. In addition to representing a tremendous boon for Israeli domestic energy needs, the finds are likely to result in significant windfalls for the Israeli state and could dramatically impact the political economies of neighboring states.

Libya’s road to democracy is shaky at best. Security is deteriorating, with targeted killings, criminal attacks, and bombings on the rise and clashes between rival armed groups—some apparently with government legitimacy and others not—growing more frequent. While these negative trends put tremendous pressure on the transition, Libya’s political process, albeit fickle, manages to keep moving. The efforts at institution building in Libya present a nuanced landscape: for every step forward in one aspect, there are steps backward in others.

U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians have in the last year focused on relations between Israel and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, led by PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Yet there is arguably a far more dynamic and perilous front: one that encompasses Israel, Egypt’s lawless Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip, the latter of which is run by Hamas.

The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.

Libyan popular and political support for engaging the international community offers the United States and Western partners an opportunity to help stabilize a North African energy producer and encourage orderly political change. Conversely, a failure to act could have costly, long-term regional and international security consequences. Domestic political limitations to direct U.S. government engagement, along with other issues that compete for attention and resources, are constraints on a more active policy. Moreover, Libyans themselves would not tolerate a dominating U.S. role.

In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.

Read the full article on LobeLog.

This essay is part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) series on “’Civilianizing’ the State in the Middle East and Asia Pacific Regions.” The series explores the past and ongoing processes of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Asia-Pacific countries and examines the steps already taken and still needed in the MENA region. See More

In the wake of the revolutionary fervor that has swept the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, retributive justice has taken precedence over restorative justice approaches as countries seek to address human rights violations.