Research & Commentary Results

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.

Iran’s high leadership has come to a consensus on an eastward shift in its foreign policy, and Russia is a salient part of that. Recent indications suggest that, at least for now, the Russians do not want to enlarge their footprint in Iran. Yet Iran wants a more proactive Russia.

The leaders of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have traditionally been known as masters at staying as neutral as possible, especially when it comes to inter-Arab relations. This was on clear display in Amman’s response to the recent UAE-Israel rapprochement.

In recent weeks, reports of a potential 25-year, $400-billion deal between Iran and China have dominated the conversation about Tehran’s options for freeing itself from the punishing U.S.-imposed sanctions regime on the country. But China is not alone in seeing an embattled Iran as a major geopolitical and commercial opportunity — Russia too has ambitions of strengthening ties with Iran.

The agreement signed yesterday by Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in which the two countries agreed to a “full normalization of relations” in return for Israel suspending moves to formally annex parts of the West Bank, has reminded the Palestinians that they cannot count on the Arab states to deliver their freedom or safeguard their rights.

No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates­—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.

MEI’s Paul Salem and Ross Harrison join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the complexity and limitations of US diplomacy with Iran, and how the upcoming US presidential election impacts the state of play. Salem and Harrison examine the issue in depth in their recent article for The National Interest, “The Layers and Limits of Diplomacy With Iran.”

Recognition of a Palestinian state is one of the potential responses European Union states are mulling in response to an Israeli annexation of territory in the West Bank, with the foreign minister of Luxembourg, for example, declaring such a move “inevitable” in the event of annexation.

In October, the United Nations embargo on arms sales to Iran is scheduled to expire.  This was a deadline specified in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal concluded by the Obama Administration.  The Trump administration stridently opposes the lifting of this restriction and is lobbying within the UN Security Council to have the embargo extended indefinitely. 

On July 27, the White House announced that President Donald Trump has appointed retired U.S. Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor to be the next American ambassador to Berlin. Macgregor’s appointment is already seen by some in Tehran as about more than just an American military drawdown in Germany: it is seen as a sign of a broader American policy reorientation in Europe and beyond.

The Israelis and Hezbollah are at it again. Earlier this week, they seem to have skirmished in the Shebaa Farms area. In their latest exchange of fire, or fiery statements, Israel and Hezbollah are continuing a new tradition of contained conflicts — one stretching back five years, when the Israelis stepped up efforts to interdict weapons shipments, destroy infrastructure, and kill Iranian or Iranian-supported officials and fighters in Syria (and indeed Iraq).

I don’t understand why Iran’s Revolutionary Guards insist on conducting military exercises in the Gulf waters that are as devoid of credibility as they are comical. Because if the goal of these drills is to intimidate or change the calculations of the U.S. Navy, nobody is flinching or losing any sleep in the Bahrain-headquartered U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, or NAVCENT.

If elected, Joe Biden and his administration will face a wide range of foreign policy challenges. Possibly none will be more vexing than what to do about the clerical regime in Iran.

In the Palestinian West Bank, a brutal second wave began over a month ago with a more than 20-fold increase in COVID-19 infections, putting an immense strain on the health care system. This strain, however, needs to be understood in the context of the ongoing violence of the Israeli settler colonial regime.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Mirette F. Mabrouk, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Gonul Tol, Alex Vatanka, and Gerald Feierstein.