In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Paul Salem, Gonul Tol, Alex Vatanka, and Jonathan M. Winer provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic engagements in the region, Turkey’s consideration of military operations in northern Syria, Iranian President Rouhani’s centrist cabinet nominations, and Libyan leaders’ decision between greater cooperation or renewed confrontation.
Read the full article in The National Interest.
The crisis which has engulfed the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) states since June 5, 2017, leading to an unprecedented diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, has effectively split the Gulf into three camps, fracturing the uneasy yet much-lauded unity of an alliance which has long prided itself on stability and security. This essay offers a possible explanation for Bahrain’s contradictory position regarding the crisis, and considers whether Manama can maintain it.
The ongoing Saudi-led blockade of Qatar came as a surprise to the international community, including the European Union. When Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Egypt, and Bahrain cut ties with the Qatari monarchy, the E.U. found itself in a new and complex political reality. Though the intra-Gulf crisis had been simmering for quite a long time, it seems that the Europeans were not prepared for such a scenario. Ultimately, Europe must consider the severity of the current crisis’ potential diplomatic and economic consequences.
The Durand Line issue has continued to complicate the unpredictable nature of the Afghan-Pakistani relationship since the birth of Pakistan. Constant tension haunts their neighborly relations, as apprehensions and suspicions co-exist with some affable gestures. No Afghan government, including the present one headed by President Ashraf Ghani, has ever recognized the legitimacy of the Durand Line, which runs through mountainous terrain and remains largely unpoliced.
The ongoing Qatar crisis poses a major dilemma for Kuwait and Oman. Consistent with their “neutral” foreign policies, these two Arab Gulf states have maintained ties with Doha and seek to resolve the gravest internal Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) row since the organization’s establishment in 1981. Officials in Kuwait City and Muscat fear that failure to settle the Qatar crisis will break up the council, which would directly undermine vital Kuwaiti and Omani national interests given the potential for such a scenario to dramatically exacerbate regional geopolitical instability.
Read the full article on The Globe and Mail.
Those visiting Doha are often told by locals that the city is the epicentre for political deal-makings in the Middle East. If you just want to do business, go to Dubai, the Qatari political elites are fond of saying.
Read the full article on LobeLog.
One way to understand the depths of the animosity that blew up the myth of brotherhood and cooperation among the monarchies of the Arab Gulf states on Monday is to look beyond the angry statements to a map published recently by the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Read the full article on Newsweek.
Citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states woke up on Monday morning to what is the most severe crisis in the regional block’s 38 year history to date. In a closely coordinated series of statements, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, along with Egypt, announced the severing of ties with the peninsular state of Qatar.
On May 20, President Donald Trump landed in Riyadh for the first stop of his nine-day Middle East and European tour. Many hoped that the president’s long-awaited trip would clarify his administration’s approach to the Middle East. As expected, the most important developments involved a $110 billion arms deal, anti-Iranian rhetoric and plans to establish an “Arab NATO.”
Accusations are mounting that Iran is ramping up its engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Like a lot of Iran’s murky foreign policy, it is difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff. The three questions that need to be answered to clear up the murky relationship between Iran and the Taliban are: why the change in Iran’s policy; when did this policy change occur; and what is the level of support afforded to the Taliban?
Unlikeliest of Allies
