Research & Commentary Results

Historians and anthropologists have focused on Muslim networks of scholars, merchants, and pilgrims that connect the Middle East with Southeast Asia. Especially with respect to the study of Islam in Indonesia, where political scientists and anthropologists approach Islam largely in terms of national politics and local cultures, this burgeoning body of literature on global Muslim networks offers both ethnographic insights into actual practices and an historical appreciation for the longue durée. The importance of this scholarship notwithstanding, much of this work focuses on formal networks of migration, trade, learning, and pilgrimage. In this respect, the cultural and political work of Islam has been largely confined to the study of either Muslim scholars or lay Muslims who participate in trade, travel, study, and migration. Here I shift the focus to a religious diplomacy tour that connected Muslims with states, citizen-believers, and global politics.

This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.

This summer’s war between Israel and Hamas, like the previous rounds — Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 and Operation Pillar of Cloud in 2012 — exacted a terrible cost not only in human lives (more than 2,100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis[1]) but also in the wholesale destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure.  The Palestinian Authority estimates reconstruction and rehabilitation costs of the recent conflict to exceed $4 billion, more than two times Gaza’s GNP.[2]

In his speech on September 10 President Obama characterized the Islamic State (ISIS) as a terrorist group.[1] There were clear political benefits to using this label, not the least of which was to facilitate the formation of a broad-based military coalition against the organization.

The following is the written testimony prepared and delivered by Amb (ret) Robert S. Ford for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing held on September 17, 2014. Click here to watch video of the full hearing (Amb. Ford’s testimony begins at the 3 hours and 26 minutes mark).

This article was first published by The National Interest.

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that Tehran regards Sunni-jihadist movements as ideologically incompatible rivals. This is not surprising, as the bulk of Sunni-jihadist literature makes it clear that Shia-majority Iran is considered to be the embodiment of apostasy. To most Sunni jihadists, including those from ISIS, Iran is an archenemy surpassing both Israel and the United States.

During his first week in office, Iraq’s new prime minister, Haydar al-Abbadi, has made a number of significant announcements, ranging from highly symbolic moves to more wide-ranging initiatives. Signs of divergence between Abbadi and his predecessor, Nuri al-Maliki, are clearly visible.

One way to grasp the immense difficulty facing President Obama as he tries to forge an effective international coalition to oppose the Islamic State is to examine the difference between this effort and the last time the United States led a diverse group of countries to take on a conflict in the Middle East: Operation Desert Storm, in 1991.

The following is excerpted from an article first published on MSNBC.

This article was first published on LobeLog.

This article was co-written by Sarkawt Shamsulddin, co-founder of the Kurdish Policy Foundation. It was first published on CNN.

This op-ed was first published in the New York Daily News.

The United States might not have had a strategy for battling ISIS last week, but it does now. The NATO summit in Wales produced one. It reflects President Obama’s instincts and his ability to corral fractious allies.

It also says nothing about the use of force by the United States.

The August 26 permanent cease-fire crafted by Egypt between Israel and Hamas and Islamic Jihad forces in the Gaza Strip offers the best opportunity in years to take Palestinians off the “diet” imposed on them by Israel after Hamas ousted Fatah security forces from Gaza in June 2007.

No sooner had that confrontation ended than Israel expanded an already draconian economic “siege” on the enclave of 1.8 million. It closed Gaza’s border with Israel—its only functioning trade link to the outside world—to all commercial activity.

Read the full article on LobeLog.